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A really efficient totalitarian state would be one in which
the all-powerful executive of political bosses and their
army of managers control a population of slaves who do
not have to be coerced, because they love their servitude.'
TABLE OF CONTENTS
IN TRODUCTION ........................................................ 379
I. OVERVIEW OF COMMERCIAL SPEECH DOCTRINE ..... 382
A . W here's the H arm ? .............................................. 382
B. The Development of Commercial Speech
D octrine ............................................................. 388
C. "Puffing": Advertising Manipulation as Trivial and
Inconsequential .................................................... 394
II. THE FIRST AMENDMENT, AUTONOMY,
RATIONALITY, AND PATERNALISM ............................ 396
A. Visions of Autonomy ........................................... 398
B. Autonomy and Rationality: The Importance of Be-
ing R ational ......................................................... 400
t VANCE PACKARD, THE HIDDEN PERSUADERS 22 (1957). Packard noted, "An ad executive
from Milwaukee related in Printer's Ink that America was growing great by the systematic creation
of dissatisfaction." Id. at 255 (emphasis added).
* J.D., 1991, University of Miami; LL.M., 2000, Harvard Law School; Teaching Fellow, 2000-
2001, Stanford Law School; Visiting Assistant Professor, University of Tulsa College of Law. I
would like to thank Jon Hanson, Duncan Kennedy, Richard Craswell, Marietta Auer, Amalia
Amaya Navarro, Jeff Roy, Reginald Oh, Ed Lee, and Jeanne Merino for reading this manuscript
at various stages and giving me their thoughtful comments. Any shortcomings remaining are
entirely my own. Thanks to the faculty at University of Missouri-Columbia, where I first pre-
sented this piece and got helpful feedback. Finally, special thanks to Jon Hanson, Nancy
Rapoport, Jean Stemlight, and Marietta Auer for offering moral support at critical junctures.
1. ALDOUS HUXLEY, BRAVE NEW WORLD xvi (Harper & Row 1946) (1932). It is per-
haps no accident that this excerpt uses language that is as descriptive of corporations as of gov-
ernment.
Seattle University Law Review
C. Behavioral Research and "Normal" Rationality ..... 401
D. Rationality and Autonomy as Normative
C onstructs ........................................................... 405
III. THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ADVERTISING ........................ 407
A . Advertising and D enial ........................................ 407
B. How Advertising Works: Brands and Bonding-Or
Buying a "Relationship" . ...................................... 409
C. "Follow the Yellow Brick Road": Consumption and
the Illusion of Control .......................................... 411
D. I Can't Get No Satisfaction-The Insatiable Need
for Love, Power, and Prestige ............................... 412
E. Fear as a Selling T ool ........................................... 413
F. T he "Q uick Fix" . ................................................ 416
G . N um bing D ow n ................................................... 417
H. Consumption: The "Wasting Disease" . ................ 418
I. "Laying Waste Our Powers" . ............................... 421
IV. HARMS AND ADVERTISING: THE PARALLEL
BETWEEN ADVERTISING AND ADDICTION ............... 422
A . W hat is A ddiction? .............................................. 422
B. Addiction: The Internal View .............................. 425
C. Bonding-Addiction as a Relationship ................. 426
D. Beam Me Up, Scotty!-Fantasy, Escapism, and
M agical T hinking ................................................ 428
E. Denial and Deception-Ask Me No Questions and
I W ill Tell You N o Lies ....................................... 429
F. "I Just Want to Be Alone"-Isolation and Addic-
tio n ...................................................................... 4 2 9
G. Numbing Down-Redux ..................................... 431
H. Summary of Parallels Between Addiction and Ad-
vertising Psychology ............................................ 432
V. COMMERCIAL ADVERTISING AND SOCIAL HARMS ... 434
A. The Special Case of Addictive Substances ............. 435
B. History and Drug Companies: Patent Medicine
P ushers ................................................................ 438
C. Advertising and Children ..................................... 439
D. Mirror, Mirror on the Wall, Who's the Fairest of
Us All?-Women, Advertising, and the Frustration
of the Prom ise of Equality .................................... 446
C O N CLUSIO N ............................................................. 449
[Vol. 25:377
Advertising, Addiction, and Commercial Speech
INTRODUCTION
In 1931, Aldous Huxley drew a portrait of a disturbing future to-
talitarian state that achieved its aims of dominance via social and ge-
netic conditioning, and that rendered overt coercion virtually super-
fluous because those controlled "love[d] their servitude."2 At the time
he wrote it, Huxley thought dangers of the sort described in Brave
New World "were coming all right, but not in my time, not even in the
time of my grandchildren." '3 "Twenty seven years later," he wrote, "I
feel a good deal less optimistic .... The prophecies made in 1931 are
coming true much sooner than I thought they would." 4 One of the
sources for Huxley's increased pessimism in 1958 was the growth of
what he called "commercial propaganda."' Although Huxley thought
"[u]nder a free enterprise system commercial propaganda by any and
every means [was] absolutely indispensable," 6 he feared it was not
necessarily compatible in the long run with democracy.' "The meth-
ods now being used to merchandise the political candidate as though
he were a deodorant positively guarantee the electorate against ever
hearing the truth about anything."8
Huxley's vision in Brave New World involved a marriage of
business and politics, a regime dedicated to the teachings of Ford and
Freud 9 in which consumption and social stability were the overriding
goals."0 Citizens were indoctrinated into accepting and internalizing
those overriding goals through a variety of techniques-sleep teaching,
genetic engineering, and the availability of widespread drug use and
escapist fantasies ("feelies"). That picture does not seem radically dif-
ferent from the society in which we currently live, a society in which
we are bombarded daily by advertising and in which the distinctions
2. Id. This vision keeps cropping up, perhaps most recently in the movie The Matrix, in
which people are given the option of taking either a red pill or a blue pill, the blue pill maintain-
ing in the user the "comfortable slavery" that illusion is reality. See Ella Taylor, Cyberreality
Bites: Boys, Toys and Girl Trouble in 1999"s Top Ten, THE NATION, Apr. 3, 2000, at 30 (review-
ing, inter alia, THE MATRIX (Warner Bros. 1999)). Query, too, whether this vision does not
have something in common with Robert Nozick's "experience machine." See ROBERT NOZICK,
THE EXAMINED LIFE 104-05 (1989).
3. ALDoUS HUXLEY, BRAVE NEW WORLD REVISITED 1 (First Perennial Library 1965)
(Harper & Row 1958).
4. Id. at 2.
5. Id. at 56.
6. Id. As noted below, this is a sentiment that the Supreme Court has shared. See infra
note 80 and accompanying text.
7. Id. at 57-67.
8. Id. at 67.
9. HUXLEY, supra note 1, at 39.
10. Id. at 43-50. The events of September 11, 2001 and their aftermath have unmistakably
exposed the degree to which the American economy is dependent upon consumption.
2001]
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between information and promotion, advertising and editorial content,
and government and private enterprise seem increasingly blurred.
From the perspective of the new century, it is difficult not to conclude
that the dangers envisioned by Huxley are real and that it may be of
only limited significance that this ethos is not promoted directly by the
government itself.
That would seem to be cause for alarm not only because Hux-
ley's vision was meant to be dystopian, not utopian, but also because,
in the here and now, there is concern that commercial advertising may
be having deleterious effects on psychological well-being." Neverthe-
less, the "cure" for this state of affairs appears equally alarming to
many if that cure is increased government regulation of commercial
speech. This is because regulation of speech implicates the First
Amendment, which is often thought to stand as a bar to such regula-
tion."
Moreover, increasing regulation of commercial speech would
represent a reversal of the current trend to offer more protection for
commercial speech rather than less.' 3 If commercial speech is analo-
gized to the traditional areas of speech protected by the First Amend-
ment, the suggestion of governmental regulation of commercial speech
is often received as an invitation to totalitarianism. As First Amend-
ment scholars Ronald Collins and David Skover have pointed out, the
thrust of First Amendment jurisprudence and theory has been rather
more preoccupied with avoiding the dangers of a totalitarian regime
such as that envisioned by George Orwell in 1984'4 than in recogniz-
ing the aspects of the "Huxleyan nightmare"'" in which we currently
live.
11. The common failure to recognize advertising as transmitting a particular ethos may
have some parallels with our general, albeit not universal, failure to view our educational system
as transmitting an ethos of secular humanism. See Naomi Stolzenberg, He Drew a Circle That
Shut Me Out, 106 HARV. L. REV. 582 (1993).
12. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S.
CONST. amend. I (emphasis added).
13. Originally, commercial speech was not considered "speech" for purposes of the First
Amendment. See infra notes 55-71 and accompanying text. For arguments that the First
Amendment should protect more commercial speech, see Rodney A. Smolla, Information, Im-
agery, and the First Amendment: A Case for Expansive Protection of Commercial Speech, 71 TEX.
L. REV. 777 (1993); Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who's Afraid of Commercial Speech?, 76 VA.
L. REV. 627 (1990); Burt Neuborne, A Rationale for Protecting and Regulating Commercial
Speech, 46 BROOK. L. REV. 437 (1980); Martin H. Redish, The First Amendment in the Market-
place: Commercial Speech and the Values of Free Expression, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 429 (1971).
14. GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 (1948).
15. Ronald K.L. Collins & David M. Skover, The First Amendment in an Age of Paratroop-
ers, 68 TEX. L. REV. 1087, 1090-91 (1990). 1 am much indebted to Collins and Skover not only
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Must we conclude, then, that the First Amendment renders the
government powerless to protect citizens from harm? If the answer to
that question is "No," then the availability of protection may depend
upon a showing of harm. That is the object of this paper. So, unlike
Collins and Skover's characterization of their project as "more descrip-
tive than normative,"16 this work aspires to be both descriptive and
normative because I propose that commercial advertising is often
harmful. Although its defenders often say that advertising is merely
reflecting us back to ourselves and giving us what we want, I suggest
that it does not really give us the intangible goods (love, community,
self-esteem, friendship, etc.) that it uses to sell us tangible, material
ones. 17 Rather, it offers us commodities as surrogates for many of
those intangible goods. Ironically, in so doing, advertising may
thereby assist in pushing these intangible goods further from our reach
by encouraging an addict mentality.
In this paper, I attempt to draw parallels between the psychology
of commercial advertising and marketing and the psychology of addic-
tion. Both appear to be characterized by denial, escapism, narcissism,
isolation, insatiability, impatience, and diminished sensitivity. Adver-
tising appeals to these impulses and addiction is marked by them. In
what follows, I explore these parallels in general and then explore the
potential consequences or side effects in three specific contexts: the
advertising of addictive products, advertising and children, and adver-
tising and women.
In these three areas, there is some evidence that advertising may
be contributing to negative social phenomena in a non-trivial way-
perhaps because of the addict mentality to which advertising may con-
tribute. That contribution suggests that the basis for extending First
Amendment protection to commercial advertising ought to be reexam-
ined. However, in order to defend this assertion and capture the harm
that may be caused by advertising, it is necessary to step back, look
critically at, and describe the existing environment, as well as some of
the roadblocks that stand in the way of such a reexamination.
for the term "Huxleyan nightmare," but also for framing the problem of the First Amendment
and commercial speech as one involving the contrasting visions of Orwell and Huxley. As will
be seen below, this framing has contributed immeasurably to this work. See also RONALD K.L.
COLLINS & DAVID M. SKOVER, THE DEATH OF DISCOURSE (1996) [hereinafter COLLINS &
SKOVER, DEATH OF DISCOURSE].
16. COLLINS & SKOVER, DEATH OF DISCOURSE, supra note 15, at 130.
17. "[N]o form of communication is more sensitive to the wishes and whims of hearers
[than commercial advertising]." BURT NEUBORNE, FREE SPEECH-FREE MARKETS--FREE
CHOICE: AN ESSAY ON COMMERCIAL SPEECH 13 (1987) (publication of the Association of Na-
tional Advertisers).
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I. OVERVIEW OF COMMERCIAL SPEECH"5 DOCTRINE
A. Where's The Harm?
Since the business of the market is often treated as if it reflected
the "natural" state of affairs,19 many consumers apparently do not
view the commercial advertising with which we are bombarded as a
form of indoctrination into a particular ethos. Instead, commercial
advertising is viewed as sometimes annoying, sometimes "tactless and- " 20 2excessive, and sometimes amusing and entertaining,2' but
essentially unavoidable.2 2  More importantly, it is almost always
viewed as benign and harmless, 23 a view that is quite curious. After
all, the very pervasiveness of commercial advertising 24 and its
apparently "indispensable" 25 role in the market economy would appear
to confirm that it has some effect on us. If it did not have some effect
on us, advertising could hardly be "indispensable." Thus, an
asymmetry emerges: advertising is deemed effective for promoting
sales, but ineffective or trivial as a factor in promoting harmful
behavior or attitudes.
18. To some extent, this discussion is unduly limited since commercial speech also argua-
bly includes speech by corporations on public issues. See First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,
435 U.S. 765 (1978). I do not cover this topic here. However, the alert reader may note that
many of the objections that I raise here to commercial advertising, in particular the resulting
slant in the public discourse, may also be made in this area.
19. See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, The Role of Law in Economic Thought: Essays on the Fetish-
ism of Commodities, 34 AM. U.L. REV. 939 (1985) (arguing that classical and neoclassical eco-
nomics set up a concept of "the market" and proceeded to naturalize it, that is, to treat it as if it
were the natural state of affairs against which all government regulation must be tested).
20. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 765
(1976).
21. See, e.g., Mark V. Tushnet, Decoding Television (and Law Reviews), 68 TEX. L. REv.
1179 (1990).
22. Martin H. Redish, Killing the First Amendment with Kindness: A Troubled Reaction to
Collins and Skover, 68 TEX. L. REv. 1147, 1148 (1990).
23. See, e.g., Smolla, supra note 13, at 802 ("What harm to the consumer does this fantasiz-
ing do? Who is hurt?"). Ironically, this question is posed in the context of ads for Nike basket-
ball shoes. Kids have been known to kill one another for their athletic shoes. See Ronald K.L.
Collins & Michael F. Jacobson, Commercialism Versus Culture, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR,
Sept. 19, 1990, at 19 ("The tragic end-product of this is kids killing kids in Baltimore and else-
where in order to walk in their playmates' $100 name-brand sneakers.").
24. See, e.g., LEO BOGART, COMMERCIAL CULTURE (1995).
Advertising occupies about a fourth of the roughly 25 hours the average person
spends weekly with television and nearly a fifth of the 20 hours spent with radio. And
advertising fills three-fifths of the space in newspapers and over half of the pages in
magazines. Other forms of commercial intrusion include point-of-sale promotion and
direct marketing by telephone or mail.
Id. at 72. This description misses a great deal of advertising that takes place in the form of cor-
porate sponsorship of sporting and cultural events, corporate names on sports stadiums, product
placement in movies, and so forth.
25. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 765.
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This asymmetry has, I believe, a psychological explanation.
Commentators often deny claims that advertising is harmful because
such claims represent an assault on our cherished self-image as ra-
tional actors. 26 It is simply offensive to our dignity, at least to many of
us anyway, that we can be manipulated with such transparent appeals
to our emotions or with obviously irrelevant data. This attitude with
respect to advertising is evident outside the First Amendment in the
"puffing" defense to breach of contract claims.
The puffing defense 27 is premised on the notion that no rational
person will, nor ought to, believe superlative or outlandish claims.
2 a
As a consequence, such claims will not form the basis of a contract
that is breached when the maker of the statements fails to deliver on
them. Implicit in this rule is that "rational" persons are the norm, or
ought to be. 29 Similarly, the Supreme Court's commercial speech ju-
risprudence reflects the assumption that the rational consumer, as the
Court conceives of "rational," is the norm. Thus, the Court has de-
clared that protection for commercial speech "is based on the informa-
tional function of advertising. '"30 In the Court's view, more informa-
tion results in more rational decisions in the aggregate.3 '
However, based on what we know about the fallibility of human
rationality along certain lines, for example, the cognitive biases that
are discussed in more detail below, the notions that advertising is in-
consequential or that most people are rational in the way the Supreme
Court appears to assume they are, specifically, that they are able to
sort out information from indoctrination, appear unfounded. Indeed,
to assert that human beings are rational in this sense looks a lot like
denial."
26. See, e.g., JULIET SCHOR, Do AMERICANS SHOP Too MUCH? 15-23 (2000) (criticiz-
ing conventional economists' construction as "rational" actors in the sense of purposive and de-
liberating as inconsistent with the evidence).
27. See infra notes 91-96, and accompanying text.
28. Id.
29. The question of whether rational consumers are in fact the norm or whether they sim-
ply should be is the question that poses the distinction between descriptive versus normative. In
this essay, I propose that the assumption is more normative than descriptive. See infra notes
157-63 and accompanying text. I say it is implicit that such rational consumers must either be
assumed to represent the majority or that the rule is a statement that they ought to represent the
norm because I assume that it would violate common understandings about fairness if one or the
other were not the basis for the rule.
30. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of New York, 447 U.S. 557,
563 (1980). Presumably, the rational consumer is expected to filter out puffing claims.
31. Id.
32. "Denial" is the psychological process in which the addict denies the manifestations of
his addiction so as to be able to continue it. Interestingly enough, although the literature on ad-
diction is replete with references to the phenomenon of denial, it is difficult to find a definition of
it. This is the closest I have come: "[D]enial consists of the delusion of control, with the indi-
2001]
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However, the common response to objections to commercial ad-
vertising or suggestions for stricter regulation, is that the regulation of
advertising will start us on a "slippery slope" that ends in totalitarian-
ism.33 In addition, defenders of advertising often claim that the desire
to regulate advertising represents an attempt to impose an elite sensi-
bility on the public, an esthetic of the intelligentsia that denigrates pop
culture.34 This "cure," these critics say, is worse than the "disease"
because they are not sure that there is anything wrong with the current
advertising environment.35
As noted above, many dismiss the efficacy of commercial adver-
tising and ask, "Where's the harm?"36 Moreover, proponents of unre-
stricted commercial speech often argue that advertising promotes eco-
nomic efficiency in the market by offering consumers the widest
possible information on available products.37 On the other hand, free
speech is characterized as a sacred and inviolable right that we en-
vidual obstinately insisting that he is really in control of the alcohol or cocaine and of his life in
general." ABRAHAM J. TWERSKI, M.D., SUBSTANCE-ABUSING HIGH ACHIEVERS:
ADDICTION AS AN EQUAL OPPORTUNITY DESTROYER 2 (1998).
This definition, indeed the very existence of a phenomenon of "denial," is not uncontrover-
sial. See STANTON PEELE, DISEASING OF AMERICA 79-80 (1989) (describing denial as a catch-
22 in which the denial of addiction itself becomes one of the proofs of its existence). Perhaps, the
reluctance to offer a definition stems in part from the problem of distinguishing denial from sim-
ply lying. People in the industry emphatically reject the idea that denial is just lying by another
name. Rather, denial appears to involve primarily self-deception, a half-conscious thrusting
away of the glimmerings on the horizons of consciousness of a disturbing fact. It could be that
denial is effectively the same phenomenon described as "cognitive dissonance" by behavioralists.
See Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behaviorialism Seriously: The Problem of Market
Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630, 658 (1999) (citing Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic Opti-
mism About Susceptibility to Health Problems, 5 J. BEHAV. MED. 441, 456-57 (1982) (cognitive
dissonance is "the tendency to reject or downplay information that contradicts other, more favor-
able views about oneself.")). Whatever its exact properties, denial has become such a familiar
concept in the culture that it regularly appears outside psychology literature. See, e.g., Gary
Minda, Denial: Not Just a River in Egypt, 22 CARDOZO L. REV. 901 (2001); DUNCAN
KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION 192-94 (1998) (discussing denial in adjudication).
33. See, e.g., Leo Bogart, Freedom to Know or Freedom to Say?, 71 TEX. L. REV. 815
(1993); Redish, supra note 22.
34. See, e.g., Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, The Anti-History and Pre-History of Commer-
cial Speech, 71 TEX. L. REV. 747, 749 n.6 (1993) (comparing Collins and Skover to "an entire
curmudgeonly school of criticism of popular culture" which they claim includes Alan Bloom's
infamous THE CLOSING OF THE AMERICAN MIND (1987)). See also James Twitchell, The
Stone Age, in SCHOR, supra note 26 ("[W]hat these academic economists have trouble with is not
consumption but taste."). See also JAMES TWITCHELL, ADCULT USA (1996).
35. Michael Gartner, Commercial Speech and the First Amendment, 56 U. CIN. L. REV.
1173, 1178-79 (1988) (arguing that regulating commercial speech is censorship, and that censor-
ship is dangerous because it is likely to spread to areas that strike at the heart of the First
Amendment).
36. See Smolla, supra note 13, at 802-03.
37. See Neubome, supra note 13, at 448-53.
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croach upon at our own peril. In contrast to these benefits, regulation
is said to be of dubious value.
Of course, this argument treats the status quo prior to regulation
as if it were the equivalent of free speech38 and requires evaluation of
government regulation against the background of this assumed free-
dom of the status quo.39 However, "[o]ne could argue that free speech
in a situation of radically unequal economic power is not free speech at
all because it is skewed by the preexisting distribution of property"4
and, one might add, distribution of access to media. As Professors
Balkin and Sunstein have suggested, the attempts by radical scholars
to rethink First Amendment doctrine in the areas of pornography and
hate speech41 "all involve techniques first used by the legal realists...
to deconstruct the ideology of the sacred freedom of contract. The
only difference is that now the attack, the assault on the citadel if you
will, is directed at the sacred right of free speech."42 Not surprisingly
then, the defenses of the "sacred right of free speech"43 also bear more
than a passing resemblance to those offered in defense of freedom of
contract.
However, this relatively new interpretation of the First Amend-
ment is not limited to offering defenses against new regulation. In-
stead, free speech appears as a weapon to wield against existing legisla-
tion previously thought to be unproblematic,44 as well as a defense
against new attempts at regulation. Additionally, many of those who
would describe themselves as progressive are so accustomed to reflex-
ively defending freedom of speech that, for this group too, regulation
of speech is often viewed as inherently undesirable. In this environ-
ment, few Realist-like attacks have been targeted at commercial adver-
38. "Animated by distrust of government, negative libertarians too often embrace the
status quo as neutral and natural. In so doing, they fail to come to grips with the government's
responsibility for defining private rights." Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Two Senses of Autonomy, 46
STAN. L. REV. 875, 883 (1994).
39. Cf Kennedy, supra note 19.
40. J.M. Balkin, Frontiers of Legal Thought II The New First Amendment: Some Realism
About Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches to the First Amendment, 1990 DUKE L.J. 375, 379
(1990).
41. See, e.g., Catherine A. MacKinnon, Pornography, Civil Rights, and Speech, 20 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (1985); Richard Delgado, Words that Wound: A Tort Action for Racial In-
sults, Epithets, and Name Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133 (1982).
42. Balkin, supra note 40, at 379-80. See also Cass R. Sunstein, Free Speech Now, 59 U.
CHI. L. REV. 255 (1992).
43. Balkin, supra note 40, at 379-80.
44. See, e.g., Aleta G. Estreicher, Securities Regulation and The First Amendment, 24 GA. L.
REV. 223 (1990) (arguing that current First Amendment doctrine regarding commercial speech
cannot be reconciled with all of the Securities and Exchange Commission's regulations restricting
advertising of securities and urging deregulation of some speech related to securities).
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tising in either the legal literature or the courts.45  Thus, at the mo-
ment, governmental attempts to regulate commercial speech may often
not survive a First Amendment challenge.
Yet, commercial advertising arguably contributes to many social
ills. Advertisers are trying to sell a specific product or service in the
market and have a powerful incentive to attempt to create as wide-
spread a consensus as possible on the meaning of the ad, namely, "buy
our product!" In the process, they simultaneously sell the idea that
human happiness is achieved through the acquisition of goods. "I buy
therefore I am"46 to paraphrase Descartes' famous maxim. Also, the
reverse may be taken as true as well: "I am what I buy" or "I am what
I can afford to buy."
Whatever the moral and practical shortcomings of a materialist
ethic, advertising also arguably contributes to a variety of specific so-
cial ills. Among some of those noted by various commentators are the
objectification of women,47 the promotion of potentially harmful prod-
45. There are some exceptions, most notably in the area of advertising for addictive prod-
ucts. See, e.g., Donald W. Garner & Richard J. Whitney, Protecting Children From Joe Camel
and His Friends: New First Amendment and Federal Preemption Analysis of Tobacco Billboard
Regulation, 46 EMORY L.J. 479 (1997); Sylvia A. Law, Addiction, Autonomy, and Advertising, 77
IOWA L. REV. 909 (1992); Daniel Hays Lowenstein, Commercial Speech and the First Amend-
ment: "Too Much Puff': Persuasion, Paternalism, and Commercial Speech, 56 U. CIN. L. REV.
1205 (1988).
In a category all by themselves are Ronald K.L. Collins and David M. Skover, whose re-
markable tour de force in a series of articles provided a substantial part of the support for this
essay. See Ronald K.L. Collins & David M. Skover, Pissing in the Snow: A Cultural Approach to
the First Amendment, 45 STAN. L. REV. 783 (1993); Ronald K.L. Collins & David M. Skover,
Commerce and Communication, 71 TEX. L. REV. 697 (1993); Ronald K.L. Collins & David M.
Skover, The Psychology of First Amendment Scholarship: A Reply, 71 TEX. L. REV. 819 (1993);
Collins & Skover, supra note 15, at 1092; Ronald K. L. Collins & David M. Skover, The First
Amendment in Bold Relief: A Reply, 68 TEX. L. REV. 1185 (1990). See also, COLLINS &
SKOVER, DEATH OF DISCOURSE, supra note 15. Similar arguments regarding the influence of
advertising on consumer decision-making processes have been made in the area of products li-
ability. See, e.g., Note, Harnessing Madison Avenue: Advertising and Products Liability Theory,
107 HARV. L. REV. 895, 895-96 (1994) (remarking that the absence of discussion in products
liability scholarship of the influence of advertising on consumer behavior makes it something of a
cipher). Again, in a category by themselves are Professors Hanson and Kysar whose Taking Be-
havioralism Seriously series, supra note 32, is explored in greater detail below. See infra notes
142-56 and accompanying text.
46. Collins and Skover also use this reformulation. See COLLINS & SKOVER, DEATH OF
DISCOURSE, supra note 15, at 88. A similar parallel of thought occurs with the quote to Calvin
Coolidge, which appears at the end of this article. Compare Coolidge, infra note 406 and accom-
panying text with COLLINS & SKOVER, DEATH OF DISCOURSE, supra note 15, at 112. Whether
I thought of either before I read them in Collins and Skover, I could not say for sure. I am
tempted to think that this is an example of the old aphorism of "great minds think alike," how-
ever immodest this construction (is not everyone "great" who shares some of our views?). Alas,
it may just be the optimistic bias at work. See infra note 154 and accompanying text.
47. JEAN KILBOURNE, DEADLY PERSUASION (1999).
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products such as alcohol and tobacco,48 the degradation of public
spaces (particularly urban neighborhoods),49 the co-opting of content
in publications based on advertiser interests,50 speculation in the stock
market,"' and perhaps others. These harms suggest that free speech
may not be as "free" as we like to think.
In what follows, I explore some of these harms and suggest an-
other. I want to answer the question, "Where's the harm?" by analo-
gizing the psychology of commercial advertising to the process of ad-
diction. Commercial advertisers are in the business of desire creation,
that is, creating desire for a product or service as a token or visible
symbol for common human desires such as love, self-esteem, status,
happiness, and freedom. The problem is, these desires cannot be
completely satisfied, if at all, by a product. Rather, advertising sets up
a vicious cycle wherein the consumer continues to buy in the hope that
the next acquisition or experience will deliver the promised feeling.
Of course, such parallels cannot be definitively proven. 2 The ideas I
discuss here are just ideas and are meant to offer an impressionistic
portrait, the details of which may or may not be able to be filled in
with more work, research, and empirical studies. Nevertheless, in
what follows, I discuss the psychological appeals made by advertising
and the mindset that characterizes addiction. It is left to the reader to
decide whether the analogy is an apt one.
In presenting these ideas, I do not attempt to argue that the cur-
rent situation with respect to materialism or pleasure seeking is any
different than it has been in other historical periods.5 3 However,
"[r]omanticizing the past is one thing; romanticizing the present is...
48. Id.; RICHARD KLUGER, ASHES TO ASHES (1996).
49. KALLE LASN, CULTURE JAM: THE UNCOOLING OF AMERICAM (1999).
50. Id. See also Eric Effron, No More Virgins, BRILL'S CONTENT, Feb. 2000, at 45 (de-
scribing the flap over the Los Angeles Times' arrangement with a major advertiser to do a special
issue promoting its Staples Center sports complex). The deal was widely criticized as a breach of
journalism ethics requiring a separation between editorial and advertising ends of the paper. Ef-
fron's essay claims that such breaches occur regularly.
51. See Marcia Vickers & Gary Weiss, The Wall Street Hype Machine, BUS. WK., Apr. 3,
2000, at 168 (arguing that a series of "polite fictions," sponsored by media hype including adver-
tising, "must be pierced" in order to avoid a culture of market gambling). This issue carried a
cover story on the same phenomenon. See id. at 113.
52. There is no agreement on what addiction is, let alone on what causes it. See supra note
32. Similarly, the empirical connection between media, including advertising, and behavior has
not been definitely made and probably cannot be made to the extent that no control group, free
of immersion in the advertising culture, can be found.
53. I believe that it is. However, I doubt that it could be demonstrated empirically. Still, it
seems that never in history have both the means and the leisure to engage in such behavior been
so widespread. For an illustration of the dangers of nostalgia, see STEPHANIE COONTZ, THE
WAY WE NEVER WERE: AMERICAN FAMILIES AND THE NOSTALGIA TRAP (1992).
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another." 4 This is an effort to deromanticize the present discussion
about the First Amendment. Hopefully, the impressionistic portrait
that I present is disturbing and may tell us important things about
both the values we exercise and the choices we make every day, not
only in the law, but also in our personal lives, in continuing to treat
commercial advertising as largely harmless.
B. The Development of the Commercial Speech Doctrine
During the first approximately two hundred years of the United
States' existence, commercial speech was not considered covered nor
protected by the First Amendment. 5  Thus, in 1942, it appeared clear
to the Supreme Court that, while the government was restrained by
the First Amendment from burdening "the freedom of communicat-
ing information and disseminating opinion,"56 the Constitution im-
posed "no such restraint on government as respects purely commercial
advertising."57  Today, this construction begs the question because
commercial advertising itself often "communicates information." In
fact, it was primarily on this basis, the supposed communication of in-
formation, that protection for commercial speech was extended some
thirty years later.
In Bigelow v. Virginia"8 the Supreme Court was presented with a
petition involving a state-wide criminal prohibition on advertising the
availability of abortion services. In that case, an advertiser placed ads
both announcing that abortions were legal in New York and offering
the advertiser's referral service there.59 The Court reversed the con-
viction of the editor of the newspaper carrying the ad6" and noted that
the Virginia courts had "erred in their assumptions that advertising, as
54. COLLINS & SKOVER, DEATH OF DISCOURSE, supra note 15, at 128.
55. Since First Amendment protection for commercial speech is a development of only the
last quarter of this past century, it might be fair to say that the implications of this change in
course have not yet been fully felt or realized. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Commercial Speech
and the Architecture of the First Amendment, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 1181, 1183-84 (1988) (noting
that the area of potential commercial speech is "far wider" than generally assumed); Steven Shif-
frin, The First Amendment and Economic Regulation: Away From a General Theory of the First
Amendment, 78 Nw. U. L. REV. 1212, 1213-14 (1983) (same).
56. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942) (rejecting commercial speech as un-
protected by the First Amendment).
57. Id.
58. 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
59. Id. at 811.
60. Notice that here, like in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), the pub-
lisher is treated as the speaker of the speech of the advertiser. While it may be that there are
sound reasons for treating them as identical for purposes of the First Amendment (not to men-
tion for purposes of tort law), it may be worth pondering whether their interests in the content
are identical.
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such, was entitled to no First Amendment protection."'" However,
because of the intersection between the issues presented and the re-
cently decided Roe v. Wade,6 2 it was possible to distinguish Bigelow
from other advertising cases, as it implicated another constitutional
right and/or involved a matter of public concern. Thus, it was unclear
whether or not the Court's holding was meant to establish a new realm
of protected speech. The Court dispelled any such uncertainty in the
next term in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Council.63
In the Virginia Pharmacy case, the Court was confronted with a
state's regulatory control of price advertising for prescription drugs.64
The Virginia Board of Pharmacy prohibited price advertising on the
theory that price advertising would launch price competition that
would in turn ultimately result in a decline in professionalism and in
the elimination from the market of small pharmacies.65 In response,
the Citizens Council argued that the suppression of price information
hurt consumers since they would not be able to conveniently discover
where prescriptions might be filled at the lowest price.66
Here, the Court found that the issue of First Amendment protec-
tion for commercial speech was squarely presented.67 In concluding
that commercial speech fell within the ambit of the First Amend-
ment's protection, the Court noted that speech "does not lose its First
Amendment protection because money is spent to project it. "68 How-
ever, in so holding, the Court relied not on the speakers' right to
speak, but on the listeners' right to hear:
Advertising, however tasteless and excessive it sometimes may
seem, is nonetheless dissemination of information as to who is
producing and selling what product, for what reason, and at
what price. So long as we preserve a predominately free enter-
prise economy, the allocation of our resources in large measure
will be made through numerous private economic decisions. It
is a matter of public interest that those decisions, in the aggregate,
be intelligent and well informed. To this end, the free flow of
commercial information is indispensable .... [E]ven if the First
61. Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 825.
62. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
63. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
64. Id. at 749-50.
65. Id. at 767-70. Virginia's argument, while somewhat strained insofar as it relied on a
number of shaky empirical predictions, was not by any means incredible or counterintuitive.
66. Id. at 753-54, 763-64.
67. Id. at 760-61.
68. Id. at 761. Of course, as the Court noted, this is also probably true of much speech that
is not advertising.
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Amendment were thought to be primarily an instrument to
enlighten the public decision making in a democracy, we could
not say that the free flow of information does not serve that
goal.69
In fact, the Court opined, it was possible that "the particular
consumer's interest in the free flow of commercial information... may
be as keen, if not keener by far, than his interest in the day's most ur-
gent political debate."7 Nevertheless, the Court did not conclude that
the government was unable to regulate commercial advertising. It
maintained that the government was free to regulate commercial
speech so as to prevent advertising that was false or deceptive.71
While this limitation sounds comforting, today72 it is largely illu-
sory. Saying that the government may regulate advertising that is false
or misleading is problematic since much of commercial advertising
cannot be tested for its "truth" per se. Because much advertising is
calculated to appeal to emotions and prerationa73 thought processes, it
is often image-based, relying on the visual, symbolic linking of the
product to pictures and symbols.74 Just as it is impossible to come up
with a definitive explanation of "the message" of a work of art, it is
also impossible to come up with a definitive explanation of an adver-
tisement that relies largely on pictures, symbols, and music over an
explicit verbal message. Trying to test such advertising for its "truth"
seems virtually hopeless.7"
69. Id. at 765 (emphasis added).
70. Id. at 763 (emphasis added).
71. Id. at 771 n.24; id. at 776-81 (Stevens, J., concurring).
72. In the early days of advertising, advertisers relied heavily on "reason why" advertising,
that is, advertising intended to sell the consumer on the reason why she should use the product.
See COLLINS & SKOVER, DEATH OF DISCOURSE, supra note 15, at 72-73. Today, such adver-
tising is much less prominent although it has by no means disappeared.
73. "Rational" is a term that is itself problematic as is discussed in more detail infra notes
125-161 and accompanying text.
74. See, e.g., Special Report Brands, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 8, 2001, at 27 ("The new
marketing approach is to build a brand, not a product-to sell a lifestyle or a personality, to ap-
peal to emotions. But this requires a far greater understanding of human psychology. It is a
much harder task than describing the virtues of a product."). This was a process to which Hux-
ley thought only the "simple-minded" were susceptible. See HUXLEY, supra note 3, at 59
("Simple-minded people tend to equate the symbol with what it stands for, to attribute to things
and events some of the qualities expressed by the words in the terms of which the propagandist
has chosen, for his own purposes, to talk about them.") Given the prevalence of this technique,
is it any wonder that many people do not want to admit it works on them?
75. There is an argument that advertising for some products is untruthful, even though the
advertising does not appear to make any claims. The paradigm example is cigarette advertising
that portrays apparently happy healthy people smoking. The anti-smoking campaign begun by
the State of Florida is called "Truth" and proceeds from the premise that tobacco advertising is
misleading. See The Whole Truth, at http://www.wholetruth.com/ (last visited Nov. 21, 2001).
[Vol. 25:377
Advertising, Addiction, and Commercial Speech
For the most part, this conceptual and practical difficulty has
been avoided as the cases coming before the Supreme Court have in-
volved factual claims like alcohol content 76 or price77 that are suscepti-
ble to verification. Nevertheless, the issue was raised, although not
decided, in the FDA's recently rejected regulations for tobacco adver-
tising. 8 It is also raised by various other objections to advertising in-
fluence. So, the limits of the exception for regulation of advertising
that is misleading have not been tested nor pushed much thus far.
More problematic for the future stability of the commercial
speech doctrine is that the Supreme Court's reservation to the gov-
ernment of the right to regulate advertising for its truth essentially
constructs the commercial speech doctrine as the mirror image of or-
dinary First Amendment doctrine. That is, because of its wording,
the First Amendment is usually thought of as a restriction on the gov-
ernment's ability to act as arbiter of the truth of the speaker's state-
ment. Nevertheless, in Virginia Pharmacy, the Court offered several
reasons why it thought this limitation unproblematic with respect to
advertising speech. First, the Court hypothesized the following:
The truth of commercial speech, for example, may be more eas-
ily verifiable by its disseminator than, let us say, news reporting
or political commentary, in that ordinarily the advertiser seeks to
disseminate information about a specific product or service that
he himself provides and presumably knows more about than
anyone else.79
Moreover, the Court observed, "[s]ince advertising is the sine qua
non of commercial profits, there is little likelihood of its being chilled
entirely by proper regulation and forgone entirely."8 In other words,
the Court found it self-evident that advertising was effective in stimu-
lating consumers to buy and thereby effective in generating profits.
Whether or not these profits are, on the whole, the product of pur-
chases made via rational deliberation on the basis of only the informa-
tional aspect of advertising is another question not addressed by the
Court. However, its decisions clearly imply this.
76. Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476 (1995).
77. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996); Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy
v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
78. See Food & Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120
(2000).
79. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 772 n.24. Of course, a motive to disseminate
information does not necessarily mean a motive to disseminate truthful information.
80. Id. (emphasis added).
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In general,"' the Supreme Court's decisions with respect to com-
mercial speech have followed Virginia Pharmacy, as illustrated by the
decisions in Central Hudson 2 (the case that set out the reigning test),
Rubin,83 44 Liquormart,84 and most recently, Lorillard." Without
elaborating on the test the Court imposed for such regulation or the
subsequent modifications of that test, it is sufficient here to note the
following aspects of Virginia Pharmacy and many of the subsequent
commercial speech cases.
First, there is the emphasis on the listener's right to hear, rather
than the speaker's right to speak. Second, in these cases, the listener's
rights are predicated on the assumption that advertising may convey
"information" to which they are entitled as a matter of social policy
because that information is a necessary predicate to rational decision-
making. Third, in all of these decisions, one can discern an implicit
assumption that the operation of the free market is free, natural, and
non-coercive.
In Central Hudson, the Court most unequivocally stated its posi-
tion: "The First Amendment's concern for commercial speech is based
on the informational function of advertising. Consequently, there can be
no constitutional objection to the suppression of commercial messages
that do not accurately inform the public about lawful activity."86 Ac-
81. There have been exceptions. In Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co. of
Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328, 331 (1986), the Supreme Court upheld a Puerto Rican restriction on
the advertising of casino gambling to local residents. Many viewed this as an indication that
there might be a vice exception to the emerging commercial speech doctrine. See Richard A.
Epstein, Foreword: Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of Consent, 102
HARV. L. REV. 5, 67 (1988). However, this possibility was foreclosed by the Court's rejection of
a vice exception and its apparent rejection of the Posadas decision in 44 Liquormart. See 44 Li-
quormart, 517 U.S. at 513-14 (1996). Although the Court did not explicitly overrule Posadas in
44 Liquormart, it might as well have since it concluded that the First Amendment analysis
therein was "erroneously performed" and it "decline[d] to give force" to it. Id. at 510.
82. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of New York, 447 U.S. 557,
570-72 (1980) (striking down a regulation that prohibited advertising by electric utility compa-
nies except to promote energy conservation). In fact, Central Hudson modified the Virginia State
Board of Pharmacy approach somewhat by elaborating a four-part test for regulations restricting
commercial speech. First, the speech must concern a "lawful activity and not be misleading";
second, to survive challenge the government interest in regulation must be "substantial"; third,
the government's regulation must directly advance the interest asserted; and fourth, the regula-
tion must not be more extensive than necessary to serve that interest. Id. at 566. The Central
Hudson test is the applicable one in force today.
83. Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 480 (1995) (striking down a regulation pro-
hibiting alcohol content from appearing on beer labels).
84. 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 489 (1996) (striking down state regulation restricting price
advertising for alcohol).
85. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 121 S. Ct. 2404 (2001) (striking down various Massa-
chusetts regulations of tobacco advertising as failing to meet the Central Hudson test).
86. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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cording to this view, speech is protected precisely because it conveys
information, as opposed to opinion, normative views, self-expression,
and the like. As mentioned above, this inverts what is thought of as
the quintessential area of First Amendment protection, 7 i.e., self-
expression, opinion, viewpoint, and the like, which may not be tested
for its truth. Thus, within the commercial speech doctrine, the Court
offers as inherently true a statement that outside of commercial speech
would seem equally self-evidently untrue: "The government may ban
forms of communication more likely to deceive the public than to in-
form it."88
Perhaps, even more significant than the focus on advertising's in-
formational content is the Court's assumption (hope?) about what the
public will do with this information. The Court in Central Hudson
seems to believe that information is a necessary predicate to "intelli-
gent and well informed" decisions.8 9 It is difficult to quarrel with that
assumption. However, the Court's further assumption that consumer
decisions will be, "in the aggregate," "intelligent and well informed,"9
appears more doubtful. It might be less doubtful if in advertising the
public received only "information" (whatever that category may be).
However, advertising offers the public some material that is at least
arguably in between information and the deception that the Central
Hudson Court felt so confident in proclaiming was not protected by
the First Amendment. This offered material is presumably that which
the rational and intelligent decision-maker will filter out. The terrain
of this material is perhaps partially captured in the doctrine of puffing.
Alas, it appears that it is precisely the stuff that we are supposed to fil-
ter out that plays a big role in convincing us to buy.
87. For an example of this anomaly, see Professor Schauer's exploration of the First
Amendment and tort law. Frederick Schauer, Mrs. Palsgraf and The First Amendment, 47 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 161 (1990). In this article, Professor Schauer proposes a hypothetical in which
instructions for the removal of protective devices on a chainsaw might be seen as part of the cau-
sation in fact of an injury resulting from the removal of the protective devices. Id. at 164-65. As
it stands, the First Amendment might protect the manufacturer from liability (at least theoreti-
cally), id. at 165, and so he proposes that a distinction might be made, inter alia, on the grounds
that these instructions are not the type of communication protected by the First Amendment
because they are strictly informational and are factual and not normative. Id. at 168. Of course,
it was precisely on the basis of the informational character of the speech that the price informa-
tion in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy was granted protection. Conversely, if the attempt to
persuade in advertising is the type of speech most closely aligned with First Amendment inter-
ests, then it would seem that it is the advertiser's non-factual claims that are most protected. Yet,
if the non-factual elements are deceptive or misleading, then Virginia State Board of Pharmacy
dictates that they are not protected.
88. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563 (emphasis added).
89. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 765
(1976).
90. Id.
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C. "Puffing": Advertising Manipulation as Trivial and Inconsequential
Puffing is a defense to a claim of fraud and/or breach of contract.
"Simply stated, puffing is sales talk that the buyer should discount
when making a transaction because no reasonable person under the
circumstances would rely on the statement when contemplating a pur-
chase."'" It is a form of confession and avoidance. "Yes, such and
such was said, but you should not have believed me when I said it" is
the gist of the defense. "Puffing describes a gray area separating non-
specific matters which [sic] cannot rationally support a decision from
statements of a more specific, and thus, deceptive nature.' '92
However, even specificity will not convert puffing to fraud if the
specificity itself is said to be of a nature that no reasonable person
ought to believe. Thus, when General Motors claimed that its anti-
lock brake system ("ABS") was "99 percent more effective"'9 3 than
protective systems such as airbags and, therefore, that buyers were
"100 times more likely to benefit" 94 from them than airbags, consum-
ers could not recover against GM when these statements turned out to
be untrue. A court held "that such claims, often involving large num-
bers, are puffing because a consumer cannot reasonably believe there
is a test behind the claim."95
Yet, if no reasonable person would believe or rely on these
claims, why was GM making them? If no reasonable person would
believe these claims, one must conclude either that GM hoped that the
vast majority of potential buyers were unreasonable, or that it was in-
cluding unnecessary, superfluous material in its ads. Neither of these
possibilities seems very likely. What seems more likely is that GM
believed that most consumers would be influenced (consciously or un-
consciously) by these statements.
Whatever GM's advertisers thought about the buying public,
what does the Tylka court's rejection of the consumers' claim that
these statements were intentionally made, fraudulent, and misleading
reflect that it thinks of the public? One reading of the opinion is that
the court operated from the presumption that most consumers are rea-
sonable and that the consumers who sued represented some unreason-
able minority. An observation made by the court reflecting a belief
that the unreasonable consumer ought to suffer the consequences of
91. Tylka v. Gerber Prods. Co., No. 96-C1647, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10718, at *18-*19
(N.D. Il. July 1, 1999), vacated by Tylka v. Gerber Prods. Co., 211 F.3d 445 (7th Cir. 2000).
92. Tylka, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at ,19.
93. In re Gen. Motors Corp. Anti-Lock Brakes Prods. Liab. Litig., 966 F. Supp. 1525,
1531 (E.D. Mo. 1997), affd, 172 F.3d 623 (8th Cir. 1999).
94. In re Gen. Motors, 966 F. Supp. at 1531.
95. Id.
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their unreasonableness supports this construction of the opinion.
"There are some kinds of talk which [sic] no sensible man takes seri-
ously, and if he does, he suffers from his own credulity.''96
Statements like this, offered in support of the puffing doctrine,
seem to contain an amount of self-congratulation that the speaker is
not one of the credulous. Also, these statements reflect a sort of pa-
ternalistic determination to discipline the credulous. What are we to
make of the widespread usage of puffing, which apparently no one
should take seriously? Its widespread use implies a conviction on the
part of advertisers that such statements will in fact be convincing. So,
who are all these rational people who will not be deceived by advertis-
ing? As advertising clearly works, it can hardly be the great bulk of
people; advertising would not work unless it worked on a sizable
number.
Then, is the puffing defense aspirational, that is, are most con-
sumers not permitted to rely on statements that the makers intend for
them to rely on because it would not be "good for them" if we allowed
people to recover for such reliance? If so, then the puffing defense it-
self looks like a paternalistic effort to get people to be more wary. Yet,
it is precisely on anti-paternalism grounds that regulation of advertis-
ing is resisted.97 Relegation in the law of a number of promises,
pitches, and claims in advertising to the category of puffing would
seem to doom a very large group (by the advertisers' calculations) to
suffer the consequences of their credulity. Therefore, it seems reason-
able to ask which response is elitist and which is paternalistic: The
regulation of commercial advertising to eliminate puffing (the protec-
tive, "I will do it for you" model) or the puffing doctrine itself (the
"tough love," "this is going to hurt me a lot more than it hurts you"
model)?
Again, the answer to this question may depend upon how wide-
spread you believe rationality is. Although still elitist and paternalis-
tic, the puffing doctrine does not look so draconian if one thinks that
those suffering from their credulity are likely to be very few-
particularly if you think this "suffering" is not very serious and is eas-
ily corrected. Indeed, this appears to be the general attitude toward
commercial advertising. Even those critics, such as Huxley and Her-
bert Marcuse, who have viewed with suspicion the emotive and, to
their way of thinking, manipulative appeals of advertising have tended
96. Id. (quoting Judge Learned Hand in Vulcan Metals Co. v. Simmons Mfg. Co., 248 F.
853,856 (1918)).
97. See, e.g., Smolla, supra note 13; Neuborne, supra note 13.
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to view such manipulations as harmless when confined to product ad-
vertising.98
However, if instead of assuming that the rational person is unaf-
fected, we assume (1) that rationality offers little defense against emo-
tional, provocative, and evocative appeals, and (2) that such appeals
may cause harms that are difficult to correct or reverse, then the harm
is manifest. It only remains hidden by the attachment to a vision of
rationality and autonomy that appears to be, at least empirically, mis-
placed.
As noted previously, in the commercial speech cases, the Su-
preme Court has relied on an assumption that commercial advertising
did or might provide information that would, in the aggregate, pro-
duce rational and intelligent decisions in the market. This assumption
is necessary to the construction of regulation as paternalism. That is,
if most consumers are rational, then regulation is paternalism imposed
on the majority for the benefit of the minority. Yet even if most con-
sumers are rational, the Court's analysis is dependent upon the further
assumptions that (1) commercial speech conveys information and (2)
this information is crucial to rational and intelligent decision-making.
The validity of these assumptions is explored in the following sections.
II. THE FIRST AMENDMENT, AUTONOMY, RATIONALITY, AND
PATERNALISM
"This fear of losing reason is a fear of loss of control"99
Since the concepts of autonomy, rationality, and paternalism are
important to theories regarding the First Amendment, I propose to
explore these concepts here. However, it is useful to begin at the most
basic level of analysis in order to dispose of the misconception (albeit
primarily a lay misconception) that commercial speech is covered by
the First Amendment simply because it is communication of some
form and to see where the disposal of that notion leads us. While
from a strictly literalist standpoint this is one possible reading of the
First Amendment (it does after all say "speech"),' 0 as a matter of Su-
preme Court jurisprudence it is incorrect. Pursuant to that jurispru-
98. HERBERT MARCUSE, ONE-DIMENSIONAL MAN 91 (1964) (noting the associational
linkage of image with meaning and concluding that it is only "[b]eyond the relatively harmless
sphere of merchandising" that the consequences of such techniques are "serious" (emphasis
added)). It is unclear whether Marcuse thought this harmless because few people would be
moved by such techniques or because the harm itself would be relatively trivial.
99. PIERRE SCHLAG, THE ENCHANTMENT OF REASON 21 (1998).
100. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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dence, it is axiomatic that not everything that is speech is "speech" for
the purpose of the First Amendment.' Similarly, not everything pro-
tected as speech by the First Amendment is verbal. 1 2 For example,
contracts are usually made and executed in language, but there exists
no free speech right either to enter into or to breach contracts. Con-
tracts are simply seen as outside the protection of the First Amend-
ment altogether. Similarly, offers of bribery are conveyed by speech,
but there is no suggestion that the First Amendment right to freedom
of expression extends to offers of bribery.' On the other hand, much
of what is not immediately obvious as speech, for example painting,
dance, or music, is considered protected by the First Amendment. 4
Usually, the response to this dilemma is to try to distinguish
categories of protected versus unprotected speech on the basis of theo-
ries about what the First Amendment is supposed to protect, rather
than on a speech/not speech basis.' For example, Robert Bork ar-
gued that the First Amendment is only intended to protect political
values and, therefore, First Amendment protection ought not to be ex-
tended to nonpolitical types of speech.0 6 Other theories about the
values animating the First Amendment have relied on the search for
truth, 10 7 the preservation of dissent, and the preservation of autonomy,
in either the positive or negative visions of that term.108 Of these, re-
spect for autonomy is most relevant for this discussion although, as
101. See Frederick Schauer, Categories and The First Amendment: A Play in Three Acts, 34
VAND. L. REV. 265, 273 (1981) ("[T]he constitutional definition of the word 'speech' carves out
a category that is not coextensive with the ordinary language meaning of the word 'speech."').
102. See, e.g., City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277 (2000) (nude dancing); Barnes v.
Glen Theater, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991) (nude dancing); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989)
(flag burning); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (wearing
black arm bands).
103. I am indebted to Professors Richard Fallon and Fred Schauer for these examples.
104. The decision in Pap's A.M. verges on the surreal in that the majority of the Supreme
Court concluded that there is a connection between crime and prostitution levels and the pres-
ence or absence of pasties and G-strings for nude dancers. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. at 280. That
serious people can take such proposals seriously while expressing doubt about the connection
between, for instance, advertising and cigarette smoking, is surreal.
105. For a discussion of this approach by others seeking to identify the value protected by
the First Amendment, see Frederick Schauer, Must Speech Be Special?, 78 NW. U. L. REV. 1284
(1983) (suggesting a multi-value versus a unitary value theory). See also, Schauer, supra note
101, at 276-77 (probably no single theory of core value can explain protection for speech).
106. Robert Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1,
20(1971).
107. The most frequent source for this argument is the writing of J.S. Mill, and his idea
that truth is most likely to emerge where there is a free exchange of ideas. See JOHN STUART
MILL, ON LIBERTY, REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT, THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN:
THREE ESSAYS 22-68 (Oxford University Press 1971) (1859).
108. See Fallon, supra note 38, at 880-85 (describing negative and positive libertarian con-
structions of First Amendment theory).
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may become more evident below, all of the other theories may be im-
plicated as well, depending upon the reader's sympathies and values.
Although scholars disagree over what advances or detracts from
autonomy, what is striking is the way in which these views seem to
share a common notion both of autonomy as rationally based and of
what rationality means."°9 Moreover, that rationality is primarily a
normative, aspirational construct than an empirical one.110
A. Visions of Autonomy
At the outset, it is not clear what "autonomy" means. Autonomy
may or may not mean the same thing as "freedom" or "liberty." In-
deed, much of the literature uses all three words interchangeably. For
purposes of much of this discussion, it seems that there is no meaning-
ful distinction.' Does "autonomy" only mean "freedom from gov-
ernment interference," '1 or stated alternatively, does it mean the free-
dom to say or do whatever one wants? This is what Professor Fallon
has characterized as the "negative liberty" to be free from external
constraint. 1 3 It can be contrasted with a vision of autonomy as "posi-
tive liberty," that is, "rational authorship of one's ends in action. '
However, as Professor Fallon points out, these two constructions
are oversimplified and do not compel any particular conclusion.
Rather, he proposes two alternatives: "descriptive autonomy" and "as-
criptive autonomy." "Descriptive autonomy," which refers to a per-
son's actual degree of measurable autonomy, involves an empirical
question." 5  In contrast, "ascriptive autonomy" refers to a person's
right to make one's own decisions, no matter however unwise or ill-
109. For a theory of the First Amendment that is strongly committed to an assumption of
rationality, see FRANKLYN S. HAIMAN, SPEECH AND LAW IN A FREE SOCIETY (1981). For a
critique of this theory, see Frederick Schauer, Free Speech and the Assumption of Rationality, 36
VAND. L. REv. 199, 204-09 (1983) (noting that Haiman's reliance on listener responsibility
seems not only empirically false, but also to absolve speakers of responsibility without offering
any justification for this dichotomy).
110. See Schauer, supra note 109, at 207 (describing Haiman's concept of rationality as
largely normative not descriptive).
111. See, e.g., Christina E. Wells, Reinvigorating Autonomy: Freedom and Responsibility in
the Supreme Court's First Amendment Jurisprudence, 32 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 159, 165 (re-
ferring to Kant's theory). Professor Wells's observation about the interchangeability of these
words in Kant's writing is applicable to other writers as well, for example J.S. Mill, as will be
seen below. But see GERALD DWORKIN, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF AUTONOMY 12-20
(1998) (arguing that liberty and autonomy are not synonymous and that certain restraints on lib-
erty are consistent with autonomy).
112. Wells, supra note 111, at 163 (concluding that both sides in the public debate over the
First Amendment and hate speech seem to share a common understanding of autonomy).
113. Fallon, supra note 38, at 876.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 877-78, 886-93.
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considered. In other words, one is free to make one's own mistakes116
as a part of the "moral entailment of personhood.".. 7 This construc-
tion also seems to parallel J.S. Mill's argument that "[t]o give any fair
play to the nature of each, it is essential that different persons should
be allowed to lead different lives.""'  In this view, autonomy "is no
more subject to measurement and comparative assessment than is per-
sonhood itself."' 19
Although, according to Fallon, these categories may at first
glance seem to track the same visions as the labels "negative liberty"
and "positive liberty," they do not. Instead, Fallon argues that a cer-
tain amount of paternalistic regulation, for example in cigarette adver-
tising that "manipulatively lure[s] people into addiction," is com-
pletely compatible with descriptive views of autonomy. 20 In contrast,
he argues that visions of ascriptive autonomy would be "incompatible
with much if not all paternalism.' 2' However, as Fallon notes, not
even ascriptive autonomy is "wholly without empirical founda-
tions.' '122 "Ascriptions of personhood themselves require minimal ca-
pacities to reason and formulate a conception of the good."1
23
Since I am unsure that respect for someone's personhood in this
ascriptive sense entails any requirement that people have minimal ca-
pacities to reason, I am equally unsure that this is quite right. Even
the insane and those in a persistent vegetative state, to state just two
examples, are said to be "persons" for purposes of the law. 124 Minimal
116. Id. at 878.
117. Id.
118. MILL, supra note 107, at 78 (Ch. III, "Of Individuality as One of the Elements of
Well-Being"). Note that this is an example of overlapping justifications, as Mill's argument par-
allels his idea that the greatest diversity of ideas will be most likely to lead to the discovery of
truth. See id. at Ch. II ("Of Liberty of Thought and Discussion").
119. Fallon, supra note 38, at 878.
120. Id. at 877.
121. Id. at 878.
122. Id. at 878 n.15.
123. Id. (emphasis added).
124. Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107, 114-15 (1966) (the insane are persons for purposes
of the equal protection clause; therefore, petitioner was entitled to a judicial hearing on his "dan-
gerousness" prior to his classification as criminally insane and resulting judgment for additional
confinement); Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 269-85 (1990) (the fact that a
patient was in a persistent vegetative state did not mean that the state could require proof by less
than clear and convincing evidence of the patient's wishes before withholding food and water
that would ultimately result in her death). Nevertheless, the boundaries of personhood and what
consequences follow from this designation continue to be extremely controversial, particularly
with respect to abortion. From time to time, arguments have been offered that some capacity to
reason or that a capacity to enjoy some quality of life is essential to personhood. For some exam-
ples, as well as a counterargument, see Robert A. Destro, Quality-of-Life Ethics and Constitu-
tional Jurisprudence: The Demise of Natural Rights and Equal Protection for the Disabled and In-
competent, 2 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 71 (1986).
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capacities to reason and formulate a conception of the good, instead
seem to dictate how much government interference (paternalism) is
deemed acceptable. However, this brings us back to the same di-
lemma posed by descriptive autonomy. Thus, even the ascriptive
autonomy concept as employed in the First Amendment area does not
rely on personhood, but on some baseline assumptions about rational
functioning. What matters then is what that baseline conception of
rationality is. Research into the human reasoning process offers some
fairly compelling evidence that the baseline conception of rationality
under which the courts appear to operate is little more than wishful
thinking.
B. Autonomy and Rationality: The Importance of Being Rational
What is rationality? Just like with autonomy, a satisfying defini-
tion is elusive. For example, "rational" is defined in Webster's Ninth
Collegiate Dictionary as "having reason or understanding."' 25 Then,
what is "reason"? When you look up "reason" you find "the power of
comprehending, inferring, or thinking esp[ecially] in orderly, rational
ways. '126 Clearly, this is not very illuminating. In Western philoso-
phy, rationality is usually conceived of as a dispassionate evaluation of
known facts and has been traditionally privileged and elevated over
other modes of thinking.'27 In a common view of the Kantian con-
struction, "[a]n autonomous person is one who judges and acts
freely ... by principles of reason alone."'128 This implies, and the impli-
cation is indeed borne out in other literature, that "rationality" is the
opposite of "emotionality" or instinct. Rational thought processes are
deemed those uninfected with bias, emotion, custom, history, and so
forth. 29
Assuming that some number of people meet these criteria, the
traditional, liberal construction of the First Amendment is that it re-
stricts the government from interfering with "our ability to deliberate
125. WEBSTER'S NINTH COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 977 (9th ed. 1996).
126. Id. at 981.
127. See, e.g., Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, in ETHICS: SELECTIONS FROM
CLASSICAL & CONTEMPORARY WRITERS 128 (Oliver A. Johnson ed., 8th ed. 1999) ("Intellect
is superior to sense."). With "rationality" thus privileged and exalted, it is hardly surprising that
women were said to lack it, thus justifying their exclusion from politics and public life.
128. Wells, supra note 111, at 165 n.30 (quoting ROGER J. SULLIVAN, IMMANUEL
KANT'S MORAL THEORY 46 (1989)) (emphasis added).
129. See SCHLAG, supra note 99, at 22 ("[A]mong contemporary American legal actors,
reason stands in a generally superior position to other sources of belief such as authority, experi-
ence, convention, tradition, ethics (and so on)."). This list is itself subject to dispute because it
would seem that experience has to be a part of what makes for a "reasoned decision."
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and our capacity to choose.""13  Such governmental interference is
viewed as interference with autonomy. However, deception itself is
also interference with the ability to deliberate and the capacity to
choose.'31 Deception as interference with the rational thought process
appears to be the basis for the judicially constructed exception to First
Amendment protection for commercial speech.'32
This construction begs the question: What is our "ability to de-
liberate?" Here again, we are presented with unarticulated baselines
and norms that are implied in the law. What sort of deception is sup-
posed to be pierced by the average person? Apparently, if one agrees
with the puffing doctrine, most advertising should be transparent.
However, behavioral research provides some illumination regarding
the human capacity for rationality and undermines the assumption
that most people will be able to regularly and consistently see through
advertising. In this respect, behavioral research also undermines the
assumptions on which the commercial speech doctrine is predicated.'33
C. Behavioral Research and "Normal" Rationality
Traditionally, "reason" has tended to denote or imply cognition
without passion.'34 Indeed, this is probably the predominate social
understanding of the term. Although there are notable exceptions, for
instance Mill's exhortation that liberty requires "energy, '"135 much
writing on the subject seems to suggest that the path to reason in-
volves the elimination of both the emotional constituents of reason and
reliance on the unexamined, for instance, tradition.'36 However, there
is some reason to believe that this vision is misplaced because our
emotions constitute an important part of our thought processes that
cannot be eradicated even if it were desirable to do so.137
130. Wells, supra note 111, at 167 (emphasis added).
131. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
132. Id. Actually, as noted above, this exception in the commercial speech area for speech
that is false or misleading is itself an exception. No such restriction to First Amendment protec-
tion is applied to political speech. If truth is crucial to people's rational decisions in the market,
is it any less so for their decisions in the political sphere?
133. Put another way, the commercial speech doctrine (indeed much First Amendment
theory) is heavily dependent upon the rational choice model.
134. "There is a long tradition criticizing the rationality and functionality of emotions. In
this tradition, which pervades much of current culture, emotions are regarded as an impediment to
rational reasoning and hence as an obstacle to normal functioning." AARON BEN-ZE'EV, THE
SUBTLETY OF EMOTIONS 161 (2000) (emphasis added).
135. MILL, supra note 107, at 87 (Ch. III "On Individuality, As One of the Elements of
Well-Being"). "Energy," as Mill uses the term, seems synonymous with "passion" or "enthusi-
asm.
136. See SCHLAG, supra note 99.
137. See ANTONIO R. DAMASIO, DESCARTES' ERROR xi-xii (1994).
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Worse still, behavioral research has discovered that human be-
ings' capacity to reason, even when employing what appears to be only
"reason," is subject to predictable biases.'38 Significantly, these biases
are relatively intractable; that is, they are observable even in subjects
who have been made aware of their existence."' These biases might
be called "illusions of the mind which are 'neither rational, nor capri-
cious. ' 140
Although a comprehensive discussion of this topic is beyond the
scope of this article, it is sufficient to summarize a few of these biases
that are particularly relevant to advertising:14
1. Confirmatory Bias.'42 The tendency to misread evidence as
confirming or supporting a hypothesis previously established.
This is more familiarly known as the "do not confuse me with the
facts" bias. ("The French have a high fat diet and lower rates of
coronary heart disease, so I do not need to worry about fat.") 143
2. Motivated Reasoning.4 4 The tendency to review evidence in
such a way as to arrive at a desired conclusion. This is more fa-
miliarly known as "rationalization." For example, one employing
138. See, e.g., JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Daniel
Kahneman et al. eds., 1982) [hereinafter JUDGMENT].
139. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Belief in Small Numbers, in JUDGMENT, supra
note 138, at 30 (many biases "survive considerable contradictory information").
140. Hanson & Kysar, supra note 32, at 633 (quoting Massimo Paitelli-Palmiari, Probability
Blindness: Neither Rational nor Capricious, BOSTONIA, Mar.-Apr. 1991, at 28 (quoting Tversky
& Kahneman, supra note 139, the preeminent behavioralism researchers on cognitive biases)).
141. There is a vast literature on the subject, but a good overview in the legal field is Han-
son & Kysar, supra note 32. For a discussion of the evidence of manufacturer manipulation of
consumers' perception of risk in the product liability area, see Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Ky-
sar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: Some Evidence of Market Manipulation 112 HARv. L. REV.
1420 (1999) [hereinafter TBS II].
142. Hanson & Kysar, supra note 32, at 647-48.
143. For awhile, the consumption of wine was touted as the reason for the lower rate of
French coronary heart disease, and wine makers eagerly jumped on this explanation to ask for
labels on wine proclaiming its health benefits. Today, it appears that this hypothesis may have
been overstated. See Hilary Abramson, The Flip Side of French Drinking, in THE MARIN
INSTITUTE FOR THE PREVENTION OF ALCOHOL AND OTHER DRUG PROBLEMS, Winter
2000, at 1-7 (reporting that current research concludes that the health benefits of drinking wine
are extremely modest and that many of the original supporters of the "French paradox" have
backed away from their earlier statements), available at http://www.marininstitute.org/
NL2000.html (last visited Oct. 29, 2001); see also David Jerigan, Drink Like the French, Die Like
the French, in THE MARIN INSTITUTE FOR THE PREVENTION OF ALCOHOL AND OTHER
DRUG PROBLEMS, Winter 2000, at 8 (documenting that the French die of cirrhosis of the liver
fifty-seven percent more often than Americans and have proportionately double the number of
alcohol related deaths).
144. Hanson & Kysar, supra note 32, at 653.
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this line of reasoning might say, "I am so busy I need to fly first
class."
3. Optimistic Bias.'45 The tendency to underestimate probability
that an undesirable occurrence (divorce, illness, death) will hap-
pen to the individual. This is the "it could not happen to me"
bias. (The tobacco industry relies heavily on this bias.)
4. Cognitive Dissonance. 146 The tendency to disregard evidence of
unpleasant realities. This is more commonly referred to as "de-
nial." (Also very important to tobacco industry.)
5. The Illusion of Control.'47 The tendency to treat chance events
as if either they involved skill or there were a causal relationship
between the event and some action by the person. Also known as
the "God complex." ("The phone always rings when I get in the
shower!")
6. Hindsight Bias.'48 The tendency to evaluate probabilities of an
occurrence higher in the face of a known occurrence of the event
than in the absence of such knowledge. This is commonly known
as "Monday morning quarterbacking" and "20/20 hindsight."
7. Availability and Representativeness Biases. 49  The tendency
both to calculate probabilities on the basis of the most available,
and often the most vivid, facts and to attribute greater weight to
known occurrences than is appropriate. Advertising may rely
heaviest of all on this feature, as it is the basis for "brand identifi-
cation."
8. Anchoring and Adjustment Effect. 15 The tendency to anchor an
estimate on a readily available figure despite knowledge of its ir-
relevance to the calculation. (Otherwise known to car salesper-
sons as the "sticker price effect.")
145. Id. at 654-55.
146. Id. at 658.
147. Id. at 658-59. Actually, the term "illusion of control" could be appropriately applied
to any situation in which people ascribe to themselves powers that appear to deny their fallibility,
for example, "Advertising does not affect me!"
148. Id. at 659-60.
149. Id. at 662-67.
150. Id. at 667-68.
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The above list is by no means exhaustive and is only meant to be
illustrative. However, as I hope the somewhat satirical examples and
parentheticals illustrate, to some extent the discovery of these biases is
not news. We have always known that we were susceptible to them.
What is different, or at least apparently insufficiently appreciated, is
that the research demonstrates that they apply to all of us, not just a
benighted, unfortunate few. Further, while these biases do not in-
variably operate in all cases, they are fairly resistant to correction
through education."5' So, there is little or no correlation between these
biases and education or intelligence. Thus, we have students at Yale
insisting that if they just had more practice, they could get better at
predicting a coin toss!152
Moreover, it appears that asking people to deliberate actually in-
creases the likelihood of certain types of errors. In many cases, and
counter to our usual expectation, it is experts who are most susceptible
to some of these biases.'53 Finally, of particular relevance to the prob-
lem of sorting the informative "information" from the noninformative
in advertising, some research suggests that people's evaluation of
probabilities is less accurate when they are given additional, irrelevant
information for their decisions-less is more when it comes to reason-
ing accurately."5 ' Evidently, it turns out that there can be such a thing
as "Too Much Information."' 5  Thus, counter to common cultural
assumptions, many of these biases are unavoidable and not simply
committed by the uneducated, the credulous, or "the other guy."
This will have particular significance when I examine the claim by
151. Id. at 657 (referring to the optimistic bias). This holds true for many of the other bi-
ases. For example, the anchoring bias operates even when the anchor is known to be irrelevant to
the calculation. The news that these biases are resistant to correction by education is significant.
Thus, the hope that Vance Packard offered that consumers could defend themselves because "we
cannot be too seriously manipulated if we know what is going on," PACKARD, supra note t, at
265, appears to be misplaced.
152. Hanson & Kysar, supra note 32, at 659 (citing Ellen J. Langer & Jane Roth, Heads I
Win, Tails Its Chance: The Illusion of Control as a Function of the Sequence of Outcomes in a Purely
Chance Task, 32 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 951 (1975)). See also Ellen J. Langer, The
Illusion of Control, in JUDGMENT, supra note 138, at 231.
153. TBS II, supra note 141, at 660-62.
154. Id. at 665.
155. DURAN DURAN, Too Much Information, on DURAN DURAN (Capitol Records 1993).
This idea is also echoed by Gerald Dworkin in his discussion of the costs of choice. See
DWORKIN, supra note 111, at 62-81. Dworkin notes that a proliferation of choices can lead to
what Kierkegaard referred to as "the despair of possibility." Id. at 73 (citing S.A.
KIERKEGAARD, FEAR AND TREMBLING AND THE SICKNESS UNTO DEATH 169 (Walter Low-
ie trans., 1954)). Since, for purposes of public policy, the proliferation of choices in the market-
place is usually assumed to be an unambiguous good, this is an argument that has been missing
from the discussion of the value of advertising.
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many that they are unaffected by advertising, discussed below in Part
III.
D. Rationality and Autonomy as Normative Constructs
We knew all these biases existed. So, what explains the persis-
tence of the belief that they can be avoided? Perhaps, it is cognitive
dissonance in the face of an unpleasant fact. At least that is certainly
part of the story. Yet, another part is that the definition of "rational"
unavoidably involves a degree of measurement against cultural values.
Because rationality is privileged, to call something or someone "irra-
tional" is to make a value judgment. However, determining what is"rational" is inseparable from the values held by the person."5 6 You
cannot know whether someone's actions are rational, in the sense of
being logically related to the furtherance of his or her goals, until you
know what those goals are. Thus, what qualifies as rational is an in-
quiry inextricably tied up with value judgments. An action will be
deemed "rational" if it seems to advance a goal that others agree is
"desirable" or "normal" in some identifiable way or would appear
likely to do so even if it turns out not to do so in fact. First Amend-
ment jurisprudence reveals some of the contours of what the law con-
siders rational and where and when that assumption may be dropped.
Set against behavioral research, most First Amendment jurispru-
dence with respect to commercial speech appears to be what Professor
Pierre Schlag might call "as if jurisprudence "1 5-insofar as courts act"as if' consumers were rational in the traditional sense of the word
and ignore evidence of limitations on rationality. However, the courts
acting "as if' does not mean that they assume this construction of ra-
tionality for all cases. Rather, they adopt a particular construction of
rationality. Within that conception, there are certain acceptable limi-
tations on the ability to reason that apparently form the basis for the
parallel acceptable exceptions to a general proscription on paternalistic
intervention by the government.
These exceptions, the areas where the Supreme Court appears
willing to drop the assumption of rationality, correspond to what can
be otherwise categorized as "low value speech": fighting words, ob-
156. See, e.g., CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (1982) (arguing that men and
women may tend to define "responsibility" and "morality" differently based on different value
structures).
157. SCHLAG, supra note 99, at 108-11. Schlag is referring to a different "as if' enterprise
with respect to the law as a whole and the resort to an "as if" construction to avoid committing to
metaphysical constructions. Still, I think it fair to say that a similar exercise goes on here. That
is, many legal commentators extol or defend a particular vision of rationality that, if pushed, they
would concede is only an "as if" construction that is not literally true.
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scenity, commercial speech, and libel.'58 In these cases, one construc-
tion of what the Court has done is to determine that this sort of speech
does not appeal to rational faculties either because it inspires an emo-
tional (fighting words) or "animalistic" response (obscenity) or be-
cause it may rely on feeding false information into the rational thought
process (false or misleading commercial advertising and libel)."'s
In other words, one's views on these questions are connected
with what one thinks someone ought to rise above by virtue of his or
her "reason," as well as what is so harmful that it is akin to an assault
on the emotions or the personhood that no one can be expected to re-
sist, that is, a coercive act and not "mere words."' 6 ° Stated another
(perhaps circular) fashion, how acceptable government regulation is
deemed to be may depend upon how, where, and when it is considered
normal or acceptable for rationality to break down. If it is considered
normal for rationality to break down in the face of fighting words, then
the law may step in. Conversely, if a particular kind of speech does
not bother the law-givers in this way, then it is not surprising that it is
not viewed by them as an intrusion on their personhood. Thus, per-
haps, racist and sexist speech does not bother this "reasonable man" or
intrude on his rational thought processes.'6 '
Finally, it seems that the law reflects a deep commitment to the
idea that behavior can be divided into the dispassionate or rational and
the passionate or emotional in a particular way. That picture tends to
mirror the self-conception of those historically in the position of law-
givers. To those persons, the quintessential "rational person" has
some few, predictable weaknesses in the propensity to rationality that
the law will take cognizance of, weaknesses that again mirror the law-
158, Wells, supra note 111, at 177-86. Whatever exception is provided for by libel has
been substantially reduced by New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) and its prog-
eny. Indeed, today, it might well be that the categories of these exceptions are empty sets in that
nothing ever appears to qualify to fit into them. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S.
377, 378 (1992) (striking down a St. Paul hate speech statute as unconstitutional despite its ex-
plicit intention to cover only that speech equivalent to fighting words).
159. Wells, supra note 111, at 177-86. Has the ability to regulate false and misleading
speech also become an essentially empty set represented by the categories of fighting words, ob-
scenity and libel?
160. CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, ONLY WORDS (1993); Delgado, supra note 41.
161. Of course, that is a reality that may be somewhat different than that of another person.
What are we to make of the fact that racial slurs and pornography are not considered assaults,
but acceptable (if distasteful) free speech? Arguably the virtual triumph of political correctness
in public speech ought to be celebrated by those who oppose governmental intervention since
this triumph was gained largely without direct government intervention on speech per se. Inter-
estingly, this is not the case. Of course, a society that tolerates endemic racism and a gigantic
pornography industry may not be sacrificing very much with a little political correctness. The"rational persons" who are subject to assault by the first speech may console themselves with the
correctness of the speech.
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givers' own judgment of when it is "normal" to suspend rationality.
However, those charged with making and enforcing the law may
themselves have been influenced by an optimistic bias with respect to
their evaluation of their own powers. Thus, when faced with the evi-
dence that all people reason in various predictably irrational ways,
many people prefer denial to acceptance of this fact. This denial is
most glaring with respect to the effects of commercial advertising.162
III. THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ADVERTISING
[I]t is this culture which, the world over, fascinates those very peo-
ple who suffer most at its hands, and it does so through the deep, in-
sane conviction that it has made all their dreams come true) 63
A. Advertising and denial
Any attempt to link commercial advertising to undesirable social
attitudes or conditions runs up against a formidable obstacle-the ob-
stinate and passionate denial that advertising causes or contributes to
these harms. 164 This is curious. On the one hand, it seems to be uni-
versally accepted that advertising is essential to business. Certainly,
business people think so if one judges by their expenditures on adver-
tising. In addition, increases or decreases in sales are routinely linked
to advertising. Moreover, in some areas of the law, for instance the
Lanham Act 165 and trademark infringement, the idea that an in-
fringement on a trademark (the value of which is created by advertis-
ing) can "cause" lost profits 66 does not seem to raise any eyebrows.
Yet, when tobacco companies are accused of causing teenage
smoking, the tobacco companies passionately deny that any such cau-
sation can be attributed to their advertising. 167 This puts them in the
162. Alternatively, perhaps it is not denial at all, but a conscious decision to choose a con-
struction that favors the existing legal entitlements and distribution of wealth.
163. Bruce Cumings, The American Ascendancy: Imposing a New World Order, THE
NATION, May 8, 2000, at 16 (quoting Jean Baudrillard).
164. See, e.g., Garner & Whitney, supra note 45, at 521-22 (describing the tobacco indus-
try's claim that advertising does not "increase aggregate demand for tobacco products, nor is it
intended to do so"). I am struck by the similarities here to the disputes over whether pornogra-
phy causes injury to women or television violence inspires real life violence. See, e.g., Emily
Campbell, Television Violence: Social Science vs. The Law, 10 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 413
(1990).
165. See 15U.S.C. §§ 1051-127 (2000).
166. See 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a)-(b) (2000) (providing both for damages in form of defendant's
profits and plaintiffs losses and for trebling of damages).
167. See Garner & Whitney, supra note 45, at 521-23.
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rather peculiar position of arguing that the billions they spend a year
on advertising is spent on something that has little or no effect.'68
Given that R.J. Reynolds's intent to recruit "pre-smokers" is no longer
subject to question,'69 it is hard to understand how this sort of defense
has any credibility. Yet it does because although most people seem to
believe that advertising is essential to business, given that advertising
successfully generates customers, people seem to simultaneously be-
lieve it works only on everyone else. 71 If advertising works, but no
one thinks it works on them, then on whom is it working? Well, the
obvious answer is that most people are wrong in thinking advertising
has no effect on them. I think this phenomenon is attributable to the
widespread understanding that advertising works by manipulation and
no one wants to admit that they are manipulable or, if they are, that it
has any negative consequences.
As marketing literature demonstrates, marketers know this about
us: "Nobody wants to admit they are in the least bit affected by advertis-
ing! They will typically claim that they do not pay any attention to
advertising despite the fact that a glance at their pantry, closet,
kitchen, or garage reveals nothing but heavily advertised, name-brand
consumer goods..''. The refusal to believe one is affected by advertis-
ing sounds a lot like denial. To get around this denial (in order to bet-
ter explore the mind of the consumer), the authors of the above quote,
who are marketing specialists, suggest that the savvy marketing re-
searcher will not directly ask subjects about the influence of ads. In-
168. Id. at 532 ("[I]t is patently absurd to believe that the tobacco conglomerates spend
over $6 billion a year peddling their wares solely to encourage brand switching and/or brand loy-
alty.") (citations omitted).
169. Internal memoranda from R.J. Reynolds reflect that the company concluded it could
not survive without the addition of new smokers recruited from those currently still too young to
smoke. Id. at 533-34. Therefore, in one internal memo, the author recommended that the com-
pany's marketing include efforts to "reach out to the 'pre-smoker' or 'learner' with 'youth brands'
of cigarettes." Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless
Tobacco to Protect Children and Adolescents, 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396, at 44,480 (Aug. 28 1996)
(codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 801, 803, 804, 807, 820 & 897) (quoting a memorandum from Claude
Teague, Jr., Assistant Director of Research and Development at R.J. Reynolds in 1973). These
are the same regulations recently struck down by the Supreme Court as being promulgated in
excess of FDA authority despite the fact that the FDA regulates drugs and nicotine is a drug.
See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000).
170. In my informal (and far from scientific) conversations with people in the preparation
of this article, I have encountered responses that tend to fall into two categories: a bemused ac-
knowledgment of the manipulation of advertising ("I love being manipulated!") to scorn ("You
mean you think you are influenced by advertising?"). Respectively, the subtexts of the first and
second comments are, "I am still in control because I allow myself to be manipulated in ways
that feel good," and "Only intellectually inferior persons are vulnerable to advertising, and I,
unlike you, am immune."
171. ROBERT B. SETTLE & PAMELA L. ALRECK, WHY THEY BUY: AMERICAN
CONSUMERS INSIDE AND OUT 38 (1986) (emphasis added).
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stead, researchers use an "indirect, projective technique" and ask sub-
jects to evaluate ads by what they think a "friend" (one whose demo-
graphic profile looks remarkably like the subject) would think of it. 17
2
Indeed, it is through such techniques and many decades of trial and
error that marketers have come to know quite a bit about us.
B. How Advertising Works: Brands and Bonding-or Buying a
"Relationship"
Advertisers want to help you have a relationship-with their
brand. Brands, and their value, are created by advertising.17 At its
most obvious level, brand identification seeks to take advantage of the
heuristic quality of human reasoning discussed above in the availabil-
ity bias, among others. That is, by creating a brand perception, adver-
tisers hope that you will identify the presence of a brand name with
better quality, reliability, quality control, trustworthiness, and so
forth.'74 Of course, while sometimes such perceptions are justified,
sometimes they are not. However, the logic of the brand is that you
will rely on the brand name as a surrogate for actually testing all of the
products in a particular category. 7 Undoubtedly, this is a good thing
in many respects, as even if you were to test several brands, you would
likely find them virtually indistinguishable.'76 Of course, this means
that your brand preference is more a matter of convenience than of
any qualities intrinsic to the product.
Yet, it goes deeper than this. While it might be perfectly rational
to rely on a particular brand name if you have had a positive experi-
ence with the brand's product, advertising seeks to create that positive
experience before you've tried it. Indeed, Settle and Alreck, the mar-
keting experts quoted above say, "There's a cardinal rule about
choices in the marketplace that marketers often find difficult to accept:
172. Id. at 39.
173. Advertisers have to walk a fine line between getting consumers to identify their brand
with the product and not making it synonymous with the product, such as when consumers say
"Xerox" rather than photocopy, since the intellectual property interest in the brand name is li-
able to disappear if the advertising is that successful. See, e.g., Union Nat'l Bank of Tex.,
Laredo v. Union Nat'l Bank of Tex., Austin, 909 F.2d 839, 845 n.15 (5th Cir. 1990) (listing
trademarks lost to the designation of "generic" such as "aspirin," "trampoline," and "yo-yo").
For a particularly disturbing account of how the value of the brand has outstripped the value of
the product with concomitant negative impact on democracy, see NAOMI KLEIN, No LOGO
(1999).
174. SETTLE & ALRECK, supra note 171, at 93-95, 114-15. See also Who's Wearing the
Trousers?, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 8, 2001, at 27 (discussing brand building as a process of
building trust and being good for consumers as a way to simplify their decision making process).
175. Id. at 116-17.
176. See SCHOR, supra note 26, at 22 (discussing how consumers in blind test failed to
identify their favorite brands of beer).
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The physical properties of the goods are important only to the degree that
they affect consumers' PERCEPTIONS!"'77
That this statement is in direct conflict with the Supreme Court's
vision of how the "intelligent and rational" consumer will behave
should be obvious. It seems to be a fairly clear use of the confirmatory
bias, that is, "do not confuse me with the facts." If the advertising or
promotion successfully inspires a theory about the product in the con-
sumer's mind, the consumer will often fit the reality to the theory.
In creating the desirable perceptions essential to selling, advertis-
ing relies heavily on non-rational thought processes. Commercial ad-
vertising is not primarily concerned with providing the consumer with
information. Instead, it is concerned with creating a feeling associated
with the brand. Authors Settle and Alreck label this "classical condi-
tioning."' 78 "By pairing the brand name of the product with stimuli
that naturally elicit positive emotional responses from people, over
many repetitions, consumers learn to associate the brand with positive
emotions. When they think of the brand, they will have good feelings
about it."' 79
So what is so wrong with this? To illustrate, when I was a baby,
my father used to feed me a hot cereal, and when I was growing up he
usually cooked breakfast for my sisters and me every morning. Many
years later, I remarked to my mother that I always linked hot cereal to
fatherly love. It was more than just a food. What is the difference be-
tween this and the emotional bond advertising seeks to create? The
difference is that my feeling and the association, however irrational,
was linked to my real experience. This is not true of the emotional
link described above, which is created by advertising. Instead, what
advertising attempts to create might be called a "fantasy link," and
fantasy is an essential part of advertising's appeal. "Consumers in the
market operate on the basis of the psychological and social images of
the goods they buy."' 8 °
177. SETTLE & ALRECK, supra note 171, at 70.
178. Id. at 107.
179. This quote comes from a section entitled "Helping Consumers Learn." Id. at 106.
The apparently utterly unselfconscious association of this manipulation with learning is stun-
ning. However, it is consistent with the overall tone of the book in which the authors represent
themselves as helping marketers and advertisers "understand and appreciate" consumers. Id. at
ix. The other forms of conditioning noted are "learning by association" and "operant condition-
ing." Id. at 107. Perhaps, many people are not disturbed by the fact that they are subjects in an
operant conditioning experiment to which they have not explicitly consented. I hope the follow-
ing sections will unsettle such sanguinity.
180. Id. at 128.
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C. "Follow the Yellow Brick Road": Consumption and the Illusion of
Control
Chapter Nine of Jean Kilbourne's powerful book Deadly Persua-
sion borrows its title from a Toyota ad that is captioned "The Dream
Begins as Soon as You Open the Door." ' As Kilbourne notes, "[I]f
this were an ad for alcohol ('the dream begins as soon as you open the
bottle')" or other addictive product, "[p]erhaps we would understand
what a dangerous message this is." '182 Kilbourne notes that much of
advertising relies on fantasy, fantastic constructions, and/or an appeal
to the wish to escape everyday reality: "Take me away, Calgon!"' 83
Both addictions and advertising offer us the promise of a much
more exciting and glamorous and colorful life, instantly, via a
substance or product. They offer us escape, not only from pain
but also from boredom and the horror of being ordinary in a cul-
ture that equates ordinary with failure. Advertising for many
products, not just addictive ones, often reinforces and normal-
izes the addict's belief that life is dull and unpleasant and needs
to be escaped. 84
"Consumption promises to fill an aching void; hence the attempt
to surround commodities with an aura of romance; with allusions to
exotic places and vivid experiences; with images of female breasts from
which all blessings flow."185
What is so attractive about this message is the idea that unruly
things like emotions, our life circumstances, intangible attributes like"glamour," and so forth are under our control, and that we can acquire
them by buying them. By "connect[ing] the powerful images of a
deeply desired social life with commodities, [advertisers] thereby
creat[e] the cruel illusion that one is possible by purchase of the
other."' 86 The urge to limit danger and to control our surroundings is
probably essential to survival. At the same time, such an urge di-
rected at things outside of our control becomes dangerous to our self-
image and peace of mind. Of course, it is not so easy to tell what we
181. KILBOURNE, supra note 47, at 217. Pertinent to this article's thesis, the subtitle of
this chapter is "Advertising an Addictive Mindset")
182. Id. at 218. The widespread use of fantasy and/or appeal to fantasy or escapism in ad-
vertising suggests that most people do not find this sort of message dangerous. Rather, it appears
that most people find this sort of advertising fun. Maybe it is just because it works.
183. See Calgon, at http://www.takemeaway.com/ (last visited Nov. 17, 2001).
184. KILBOURNE, supra note 47, at 224.
185. CHRISTOPHER LASCH, THE CULTURE OF NARCISSISM: AMERICAN LIFE IN AN
AGE OF DIMINISHING EXPECTATIONS 72-73 (1979).
186. Sut Jhally, Commercial Culture, Collective Values, and the Future, 71 TEX. L. REV.
805, 809 (1993).
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can control and what we cannot, perhaps less so than ever before.
Thus, the need to control is an urge that often borders on the insatia-
ble, which is perfect for advertisers' purposes."'
Marketers and advertisers try to figure out "what's going on in-
side consumers' minds." '  Not content with simply getting inside
consumers' minds to understand existing influences on decisions, ad-
vertising, through a variety of methods, is intended to create an asso-
ciation that did not previously exist in the consumer's mind between
the pre-existing desirable image or concept and the product or service
advertised. One of these methods is associating the goods with a
stimulus."l 9 One example is the Newport cigarettes advertising slo-
gan, "Alive with pleasure!""19 Advertisers juxtaposed this slogan with
pleasant pictures of people, often couples, apparently having a good
time. The idea was to have consumers associate the pleasant scene
with the brand of the product. 9 '
D. I Can't Get No Satisfaction-The Insatiable Need for Love, Power,
and Prestige
However, the most successful appeal, and probably the most
popular by far, is to associate the product with the idea of romantic or
familial love. Perhaps, the principal reason for this is the "insatiabil-
ity of the desire for love. As Settle and Alreck put it, "Who in the
world has too much love?... Today's consumers have (1) ample re-
sources for goods that promise affiliations; (2) an insatiable need for
friendship; and (3) few traditional sources for affiliation and friend-
ship. Is it any wonder that they try to buy it?"' 93 Yet as the authors
themselves admit, "[c]onsumer goods can't really provide those who
buy them with affiliation or belonging; only people can actually fulfill
such needs."'94 One would think that if a product cannot satisfy the
need stimulated by its advertising, this would be a prescription for
failure. However, this is not the case. Rather, it seems that failure to
satisfy is a necessary part of keeping the cycle going. As one observer
put it, in modern America "[t]he engines of economic development
187. For example, a number of television ads for prescription drugs urge that the consumer
"take control" of their diabetes, depression, premenstrual dysphoric disorder, and the like.
188. SETTLE & ALRECK, supra note 171, at 7.
189. Id. at 93.
190. KILBOURNE, supra note 47, at 196-98. Kilbourne also points out that, when viewed
as a group, these ads seemed to also contain a disturbing theme of violence against women. Id.
191. Id. at 94.
192. Id. at 16.
193. Id. at 17.
194. Id.
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were powered in part by a dynamic of deprivation which kept fulfill-
ment always just out of reach."' 95 Moreover, what the authors do not
say is that "[t]he possession of material things serves as an antidote to
dependence upon other people."'96 That is, chasing things to satisfy
needs that can only be filled by people distances one from other people.
Even if you are not looking for an antidote to dependence on oth-
ers, if you are bombarded with advertising implying that friendship,
self-esteem, love, and the like can be acquired along with material
goods, it is understandable that this distinction between people and
things is liable to blur. If you are disappointed because your life does
not become more social, you are not more glamorous, you have no
more love, and so forth, you might view the disappointment as a fail-
ure of this particular product, thinking the next one might "do it."
Alternatively, you might just think that there is something wrong with
you. It is in this latter possibility, the triggering of our fears, that ad-
vertising does much of its work.'
E. Fear as a Selling Tool
Rather than merely conjuring up pictures of love and family to
inspire positive associations, advertising also preys on our fears about
whether we are worthy of such love. Judging by some current adver-
tising, we apparently have a lot of fears. We are assailed daily with
messages that, if we want love, we had better look good, smell good,
be thin enough, successful enough, cool enough, ad nauseum."9 "Love
is Blind not Senseless" says Scope® mouthwash against a blue, bubbly
background.199 The underlying message is clear. Your breath might
be bad, and if you want someone to love you, kiss you, or hang
around, you had better use Scope® to make sure that you measure up.
195. JACKSON LEARS, FABLES OF ABUNDANCE 20 (1994).
196. ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, PASSION: AN ESSAY ON PERSONALITY 155
(1984).
197. Some observers would go so far as to say that there is an element of the religious in
advertising's relentless appeal to these insatiable desires that seem characteristic of the human
condition and inextricably intertwined with expressions of deepest held values and beliefs. "The
ultimate power of advertising does not rest on its creative ingenuity or its ability to manipulate
(which is not to deny its effectiveness in those areas), but on its ability to mediate the dialectic of
emptying and needing." SUTJJHALLY, THE CODES OF ADVERTISING 203 (1990).
198. Although narcissism is often assumed to involve a love of self, it is probably more ac-
curate to describe it as an obsession with self that, more often than not, is self-critical. "Narcis-
sus gazes at his own reflection, not so much in admiration as in unremitting search of flaws, signs
of fatigue, decay." LASCH, supra note 185, at 91. Perhaps, this is not an accurate reading of the
Greek myth's import, but it certainly seems descriptive of American psychology as reflected in
advertising appeals.
199. See PEOPLE MAG., Mar. 20, 2000, at 140.
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Of course, people probably worried about bad breath long before
Scope®'s advertisers told them they ought to do so, but advertising
seems to create some fears by bootstrapping a contrived fear onto a
more general fear. Take, for instance, quality of gasoline. Prior to the
introduction of ethyl additives and the advertising directed at linking
ethyl with engine knock and performance, it seems unlikely that many
people feared their gasoline was "inadequate." However, in 1933,
Ethyl ran an ad showing a small boy complaining to his father, "Gee,
Pop-they're all passing you!"2"0 Ethyl was touted as the solution to a
slow car and the "next best thing to a brand new car."2 1 To be sure,
the development of lead additives to gasoline was a response to con-
sumer complaints about engine knock.2"2 Racing and not wanting to
be passed up certainly are not the inventions of advertisers. What is
interesting is how they are combined to create notice, to draw your at-
tention to the fact that here is a "problem" that perhaps you did not
know you had, as well as the solution. Thus, concepts and concerns
from disparate areas of life, engine knock and competition, coalesce
and crystallize, essentially becoming embodied in the product. Now,
engine knock is a problem of power and prestige.
The idea that advertising might be designed to arouse our inse-
curities about our lives and ourselves is not new. In 1958, Aldous
Huxley wrote in Brave New World Revisited:
The principles underlying this kind of propaganda [advertising]
are extremely simple. Find some common desire, some wide-
spread unconscious fear or anxiety; think out some way to relate
this wish or fear to the product you have to sell; then build a
bridge of verbal or pictorial symbols over which your customer can
pass from fact to compensatory dream, and from the dream to the il-
lusion that your product, when purchased, will make the dream
come true.2 °3
Nowhere does this seem more apparent than in the advertising
directed at women. American women are often portrayed in the cul-
ture as obsessed with their weight.0 4 Once again, the question of
200. Jamie Lincoln Kitman, The Secret History of Lead, THE NATION, Mar. 20, 2000, at
22.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 16.
203. HUXLEY, supra note 3, at 60 (emphasis added).
204. There is a mountain of evidence on this point, and it would greatly expand this paper
to cite more than a fraction of it. Both Lasn and Kilbourne discuss this at length. See LASN,
supra note 49, at 75 ("Nine out of ten North American women feel bad about some aspect of
their bodies, and men are not far behind."); KILBOURNE, supra note 47, at 128-154 (Ch. 6, "The
More You Subtract the More You Add"); JOAN JACOBS BRUMBERG, THE BODY PROJECT: AN
INTIMATE HISTORY OF AMERICAN GIRLS 97-137 (1997). It has also been extensively covered
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whether advertising merely reflects that cultural obsession, or has a
role in creating or driving it, is a matter of fierce debate, just as it is
with respect to whether violence in media causes children to be more
violent, or pornography causes violence against women.0
However, in pondering this question, the following incident is
extremely interesting and has been widely reported. 0 6 In Fiji, what
would be considered here obesity is very common. "Before television
was available, there was little talk of dieting in Fiji. 'You've gained
weight' was a traditional compliment and 'going thin' the sign of a
problem. ' 217  Just three years after the introduction of television to
Fiji, Harvard researcher Dr. Anne Becker noted that the number of
teenage girls who had ever vomited to control their weight went from
three to fifteen percent. 2" The percentage of those who said they had
dieted in the past year was sixty-two percent. Apparently, that was a
100 percent increase in the number of those who reported having di-
eted in the past year. Prior to the introduction of television, Dr.
Becker reported that high school age girls in Fiji "[w]ould express cu-
riosity about dieting: What is it about? 20 9 Not so after the introduc-
tion of television. This example is highly suggestive about the power
of the media, an integral part of which is advertising. 0
in other media. See, e.g., Daniel S. Greenberg, Brazen Anti-Fat Industry Relentlessly Sells the
Futile Ethic of Thin, Los ANGELES TIMES, Mar. 8, 1989, § 2, at 7 (quoting study finding that
high school girls fear obesity and that elementary school children regard obesity as worse than
being disabled). Of course, there is some question whether or not obesity is itself a disability
and, if so, at what level. Certainly, much of the evidence seems to point to the conclusion that it
is profoundly socially disabling.
205. See Campbell, supra note 164.
206. See, e.g., Karen Patterson, Through Thick and Thin; Americans Lose Sense of Proportion
in Struggling with Their Weight, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Aug. 29, 1999, at 1J.
207. KILBOURNE, supra note 47, at 135.
208. See Patterson, supra note 206.
209. Id.
210. The example also raises questions about just what we are exporting besides our politi-
cal values. This fear of a cultural export may be part of what is contributing to what the New
York Times has reported as an increased hostility toward everything American in Europe-not
to mention elsewhere in the world. See Suzanne Daley, Europe's Dim View of U.S. Is Evolving
into Frank Hostility, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 2000, at 1, 10. It is worth pointing out that not all me-
dia giants are American companies. See BOGART, supra note 24, at 49-51 (describing globaliza-
tion of media giants). However, this merely highlights that the ethos pushed by commercial ad-
vertising is not necessarily American but commercial. It is worth considering the degree to
which governments exist at the pleasure of these corporate giants and not the other way around.
If it were even feasible (given the degree to which politicians are beholden to corporate donors
and lobbyists) that the United States were to attempt a major restructuring of media law in a way
that posed a serious threat to their interests, to what lengths would the media giants go to protect
themselves?
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Of course, it would be perverse to inspire fear if you did not also
provide the "solution," and Americans have been credited with a par-
ticularly strong "can do" attitude.211 Not surprisingly then, the "solu-
tion" that advertisers propose to a myriad of problems is their prod-
uct. Kilbourne notes that such appeals "connect with the core belief of
American culture-that we can re-create ourselves, transform our-
selves, indeed we should. 2 12 By manipulating our fears, advertising
tells us that not only is such a personal overhaul possible, but also it is
probably necessary, as we probably are not witty enough, powerful
enough, sexy enough, or young enough to get what we want.
Advertising "not only promises to palliate all the old unhappi-
ness to which flesh is heir; it creates or exacerbates new forms of un-
happiness-personal insecurity, status anxiety, anxiety in parents ....
Advertising institutionalizes envy and its attendant anxieties. "213
Having thus stoked consumers' anxieties, advertisers then rush to the
rescue to solve the "problem." "[W]e can do it all effortlessly," much
advertising seems to say, "if we just use the right products. 214
F. The "Quick Fix"
If there is any description that best summarizes the junkie men-
tality, it is the idea of the "quick fix," the notion that a problem or an
uncomfortable feeling can be fixed effortlessly. From the heroin sub-
culture, the term "quick fix" has entered general usage to describe the
fast, simple solution. The quick fix also appeals to the illusion of con-
trol. If a problem is susceptible to being "fixed," then it is under your
control. On the other hand, the term "quick fix" carries (or used to
carry) a derogatory connotation of a superficial, impermanent, and
cosmetic solution--except for marketers.
In marketing, the idea of the "quick fix" is unambiguously posi-
tive because promoting ease is an essential part of marketing psychol-
ogy. 215 When is the last time you saw a product or service advertised
in which the ad suggested the product or service would be hard, diffi-
cult, or time consuming to use? Moreover, absurd and catastrophic
211. Roberto Unger and Cornel West call this the "American Religion of Possibility" in
their manifesto for reform. ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER & CORNEL WEST, THE FUTURE
OF AMERICAN PROGRESSIVISM 6-13 (1998).
212. KILBOURNE, supra note 47, at 223.
213. LASCH, supra note 185, at 73.
214. KILBOURNE, supra note 47, at 223.
215. Despite Leo Bogart's conclusion that in advertising there is no winning formula,
BOGART, supra note 24, at 85, I think conveying the message that something is "simple,"
"easy," or "quick" comes pretty close. It is difficult to think of any exceptions to this as a posi-
tive selling point.
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consequences are sometimes suggested as the penalty for failing to use
the "simple" solution. For example, in the 1950s, advertising urged
adolescent girls to use training bras and girdles in order to ensure the
perfection of their ensuing lives. "As adults, they would have good
figures and happy futures because they had chosen the correct under-
wear in their youth." '216
Advertising promotes and encourages a belief that "life should be
easy and painless. ''2 17 Although, theoretically, all this emphasis on
consumption could spur us to work harder so we can afford to con-
sume more, the opposite also seems possible. "Television advertising,
with its continual hyped-up breathless euphoria, conveys the impres-
sion that life is easy, that good things are coming our way. '218 More-
over, it presents a picture in which it implies that everyone else is
enjoying such a life. "Theirs is a world of pure romance and warm
fellow-feeling, of strongly knit, secure family relationships, of indi-
viduals untroubled except by the fleeting, easily curable distress of bad
breath, high cholesterol, or clogged drains. 219
If this vision of the world is what we think of as normal, then we
can become resentful and anxious that our own lives do not seem to
mirror that ease. 22' The impression of ease, also arguably "undermines
the work ethic, the old notions that life is a struggle, that good things
must be earned through hard work, and that hard work requires
preparation and the learning of skills. ,221 "We shouldn't have to work
too hard at our jobs or relationships. We shouldn't have to struggle to
alter our moods or have a good time. ' 222 But ominously, "This belief in
instant transformation is at the heart of addiction. "223
G. Numbing Down
Another reason for the misconception that "advertising does not
affect me" may be advertising's sheer ubiquity. It is literally almost
everywhere, even in some unusual places like at the bottom of a golf
216. BRUMBERG, supra note 204, at 114.
217. KILBOURNE, supra note 47, at 223.
218. BOGART, supra note 24, at 85.
219. Id. at 82.
220. As Professor Robert Nozick has noted, envy is comparative. While it might be a mat-
ter of small concern to know that someone somewhere is better off, it is another thing altogether
to be confronted with him daily. See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA
(1974). Advertising on television, on billboards, and increasingly even in schools confronts daily
those less well off with those who are apparently better off.
221. BOGART, supra note 24, at 85.
222. KILBOURNE, supra note 47, at 223.
223. Id.
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hole or in displays in public restrooms.224 One of the consequences of
this fact may be that we tune much of it out and are not consciously
aware of it anymore-although we may nevertheless be affected. Even
if we do not want to buy the product, we may be affected by the level
of exposure to the extent that we become numb.22s Over saturation
may render us indifferent to trying to discern the difference between
reality and illusion, hype and information.
"Overexposure to manufactured illusions soon destroys their
[ads'] representational power. The illusion of reality dissolves, not in
a heightened sense of reality as we might expect, but in a remarkable
indifference to reality. ' 26  "Even a rational understanding of the tech-
nique by means of which a given illusion is produced does not necessarily
destroy our capacity to experience it as a representation of reality. '227
This theory of a sort of numbing down to the effects of a barrage of
advertising is used to explain why some advertisers have resorted to
shock advertising techniques such as Benetton's use of dying AIDS
victims and death row inmates. 2 ' The theory is that ordinary appeals
are no longer enough to grab our attention and, therefore, particularly
dramatic, shocking, and graphic appeals are needed.229
H. Consumption: The "Wasting Disease"
In the modern consumer culture, today's satisfaction is placed
ahead of delayed gratification. "Why save for tomorrow when you
can spend today?" advertising implicitly tells us. Even better, why
wait until you have money to spend? Spend tomorrow's money. It is
224. LASN, supra note 49, at 19-21. Even more bizarre schemes collected in Lasn's book
include ads in people's hair, IBM beaming its logo onto the clouds, and the manufacturer of
Skippy peanut butter announcing its plan to stamp its logo on the New Jersey beaches "where
it... [would] push peanut butter for a few hours before being washed away by the waves." Id.
at 20-21.
225. The idea that because particular ads lose effectiveness over time means that we are
immune to them is debatable. Authors Jonathan Bond and Richard Kirshenbaum have said,
"Consumers are like roaches .... We spray them with marketing, and for a time it works.
Then, inevitably, they develop an immunity, a resistance." Who's Wearing the Trousers?, supra
note 174, at 27. 1 would argue that this phenomenon is more akin to an addict's development of
tolerance to the drug so that he has to take larger doses. In any event, the fact that a particular ad
does not have the effect that the advertiser would like it to have does not mean that it is not hav-
ing any effect.
226. LASCH, supra note 185, at 87.
227. Id.
228. LASN, supra note 49, at 22-23. Lasn says that Advertising Age columnist Bob Garfield
has dubbed such ads "advertrocities." Id. at 22.
229. See BOGART, supra note 24, at 77 (1995) (attributing the Benetton ads to the advertis-
ers' desire to overcome the "reduction of viewer attentiveness," which he hypothesizes is a reac-
tion to the over saturation of audiences with advertising). If this is right, one shudders to think
what will happen when we become inured to these ads.
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on just such thinking that the vast and powerful credit card industry is
built.23° This is an ideology in which there is little or no market value
for long term thinking or planning, whether for savings or for the en-
vironment. "The consumer is the one who destroys or expends by
use, the one who devours all." 231
Of course, this feature of the consumer economy means more
needs to be replaced from that devoured today. In modern America,
with planned obsolescence and a proliferation of meaningless choices,
what seems to result is a sort of circular dynamic. Do consumers con-
sume in order to support producers, or do producers produce so that
we may consume to our fill? Either way, it seems "it is a discourse in
the service of waste. ,23 2 Yet, despite the cries from others in less privi-
leged positions that we are consuming far more than our share of the
earth's limited resources, is not the point of all this consumption that
it is supposed to allow us to feel better, to better "realize" ourselves?
What would it mean if it does not?
It seems that despite having one of the most affluent cultures in
the world, we are not feeling so great. Society is ravaged with vio-
lence, sometimes at the hands of children. Depression, addiction,
teenage suicide--despite popular belief, it does not get any better at
the top. Economist Juliet Schor of Harvard reports that in a survey of
"a large telecommunications company, among those who reported dis-
satisfaction with their incomes, the more they made, the larger their
dissatisfaction appeared. ' 233  Essentially, according to her study, the
more you make, the more dissatisfied you are likely to be. 34 "Plenti-
tude is American culture's perverse burden. Most Americans have
everything they could possibly want, and still they don't think it's
230. Significantly, Citibank is now resorting to advertising urging consumers to spend re-
sponsibly, to save special expenditures for special occasions. A recently running ad features a
man and a woman trying to put more shopping bags into an already overflowing trunk. The
caption reads, "Just because you can doesn't mean you should." More text in the lower, left
hand comer exhorts the reader to "seek balance and spend wisely." See PEOPLE MAG., Nov. 19,
2001, at 48.
There is a remarkable parallel here to the alcohol industry's similar attempt to adopt a posi-
tion of corporate responsibility through ads carrying disclaimers to "think before you drink" and
to drink responsibly. Given that the credit card industry, just like the alcohol industry, may be
heavily dependent upon the supposedly irresponsible user, there is reason to view these appeals
with some skepticism, that is, to question whether or not their other advertising efforts effec-
tively neutralize the "responsibility" message.
231. COLLINS & SKOVER, DEATH OF DISCOURSE, supra note 15, at 92.
232. Id. at 93.
233. Juliet Schor, We Want What We Cannot Afford, BOSTON GLOBE, May 17, 1998, at
El. See also JULIET A. SCHOR, THE OVERSPENT AMERICAN: UPSCALING, DOWNSHIFTING
AND THE NEW CONSUMER (1998) (detailing the views in the article, along with supporting
data) [hereinafter SCHOR, THE OVERSPENT AMERICAN].
234. Schor, supra note 233.
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nearly enough. When everything is at hand, nothing is ever hard-won,
and when nothing is hard-won, nothing really satisfies."23
The findings of this survey were consistent with other such re-
search by Harvard Business School Professor Susan Fournier and oth-
ers23 6 and led Schor to conclude that increases in income do not corre-
late to increases in happiness the way it is commonly assumed.237
Moreover, she attributes this phenomenon to the fact that the bench-
marks against which we measure our own lives have shifted from our
immediate neighbors, friends, and family, who probably are more or
less within the same income bracket as ourselves, to people earning"three, four, or five times" more than ourselves.238 Settle and Alreck
also note this trend in what they characterize as an increased willing-
ness of consumers to splurge, even by consumers "who don't seem to
'know their place." 239 It is tempting to consider what role the relent-
less promotion of credit cards have had, both in this phenomenon and
in the surge in bankruptcy filings which prompted the credit card
companies to lobby Congress for tightening of the bankruptcy laws.24°
Whatever the reasons, it would seem obvious that if our goals for
self-realization and happiness are, in economic terms, almost impossi-
bly high and out of reach, we will be unhappier rather than happier for
235. LASN, supra note 49, at 11 (emphasis added). Lasn's assertion that most Americans
have everything they could possibly want may be overstated. Certainly, it is not overstated when
one compares the average American's circumstances to those of persons in many other parts of
the world. On the other hand, Americans enjoy a lower quality of life on several fronts, such as
health care and job and economic security, than those in many other developed nations with
which the United States might reasonably be compared. See, e.g., DEREK BOK, THE STATE OF
THE NATION 366-89 (1996).
236. Susan Fournier & Michael Guiry, An Emerald Green Jaguar, a House on Nantucket,
and an African Safari: Wish Lists and Consumption Dreams in a Materialist Society, 20
ADVANCES IN CONSUMER RES. 352, 352-58 (1993).
237. SCHOR, THE OVERSPENT AMERICAN, supra note 233.
238. Id.
239. SETTLE & ALRECK, supra note 171, at 311.
240. Compare SCHOR, supra note 26, at 10-11 (noting rise in bankruptcy rates from
200,000 a year in 1980 to 1.4 million in 1998 with a parallel growth in credit card debt) with
Robert Reno, Health Care, Not Bankruptcy, 'Reform,' NEWSDAY, Apr. 29, 2000 (citing Harvard
Professor Elizabeth Warren's bankruptcy study, finding that 40% of personal bankruptcies were
related to medical expenditures, not binge spending on credit cards, and calling the proposed
reform the "Creditor Relief Act"); Editorial, Unjust Bankruptcy Reform, Los ANGELES TIMES,
Apr. 26, 2000, at B8 (noting the multi-million dollar lobbying efforts by banks and credit card
companies for favor of bankruptcy reform).
Schor argues that survey data reflects that while most credit card holders claim they do not
intend to use them, roughly two thirds do and tend to underestimate the amount of debt on their
credit cards by a factor of two--a phenomenon economists call "hyperbolic discounting."
SCHOR, supra note 26, at 20-21. Hyperbolic discounting may be just another term for the opti-
mistic bias and denial. At any rate, credit card companies' lobbying efforts suffered a set back
after the events of September 11, 2001 and may be stalled for some time to come if the current
perception, that consumer spending needs to be encouraged, continues.
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all this.241 Thus, it is possible that commercial advertising frustrates
the very thing on which one of its claims to protection relies. Far from
satisfying us, it virtually guarantees that satisfaction will, at least for
many, remain elusive as long as our gaze remains fixed upwards and
toward the material at which advertising directs our attention.
I. "Laying Waste Our Powers "242
Instead of making us more autonomous, there is at least the pos-
sibility that advertising leads to our being less autonomous insofar as
we unthinkingly follow the patterns of behavior, modes of self-
expression and identity,2 43 and even rebellion 244 defined for us in part
by advertisers. Kalle Lasn, media and advertising critic, and founder
of Adbusters magazine and author of Culture Jam: The Uncooling of
AmericaTM,2 4S argues that the level of advertising to which Americans
are exposed amounts to indoctrination into a cult. 246 "Cult members
aren't really citizens. The notions of citizenship and nationhood make
241. It may be that states are stepping into the breach (or is it exacerbating the existing
trend?) with the establishment of state run lotteries, a development that is more or less contem-
poraneous with the development of the commercial speech doctrine. See CHARLES T.
CLOTFELTER & PHILLIP J. COOK, SELLING HOPE 4 (1998) (locating interest in state-run lot-
teries as beginning in the late 1960s and early 1970s); see also Gambling Impact and Behavioral
Study, NAT'L OPINION RES. CENTER U. CHI., (Report to the National Gambling Impact Study
Commission), Apr. 1, 1999 [hereinafter Gambling Impact].
Lotteries appeal to fantasies of wealth and expectations measured against those in the highest
income bracket. Again, debate over the advisability of lotteries often revolves around paternal-
ism or anti-paternalism arguments. CLOTFELTER & COOK, supra, at 11. However, this misses
a major issue. "The states now offering lotteries do not simply make a product available in order
to accommodate the widespread taste for buying a low-priced chance at a big prize. They seek to
foster that taste." Id. (emphasis added). The issues raised by lotteries, in particular the entan-
glement of the government with advertising ideology are too complex to adequately cover here,
but deserve mention in light of the thesis of this paper and the possibility of addictive behavior
associated with gambling.
242. WILLIAM WORDSWORTH, THE WORLD IS Too MUCH WITH US; LATE AND
SOON, reprinted in WORDSWORTH'S POEMS OF 1807, at 55 (Alun R. Jones ed., 1987).
243. See DOUGLAS KELLNER, MEDIA CULTURE: CULTURAL STUDIES, IDENTITY AND
POLITICS BETWEEN THE MODERN AND THE POSTMODERN 255-60 (1995).
244. Advertisers for cigarettes and alcohol have long sold the idea that smoking and drink-
ing equal rebellion. See KILBOURNE, supra note 47, at 151-215. However, advertisers for other
products have also used the imagery of rebellion to sell everything from candy to cars to cosmet-
ics. Id. at 292-314.
245. See LASN, supra note 49.
246. It is on this ground that the American Psychologists Association is considering cen-
sure for members who do consulting work for the manufacturers of children's toys. See "A Tro-
jan Horse for Advertisers", BUS. WK., Apr. 3, 2000, at 10. Professor James Twitchell agrees, re-
ferring to modern culture as "Adcult." Unlike Lasn, Twitchell does not think this is necessarily
a bad thing. Rather, Twitchell argues that advertising is a location for the creating cultural
meaning in which "[y]ou cannot tell the dancer from [the] dance." TWITCHELL, supra note 34,
at 124. This argument seems to ignore who is paying the piper and in whose economic interest it
is that the dance continues.
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little sense in this world. We're not fathers and mothers and brothers:
we're consumers .... The only Life, Freedom, Wonder and Joy in our
lives are the brands on our supermarket shelves. '24 7  "Advertising
serves not so much to advertise products as to promote consumption
as a way of life." 248 Yet, we are not really happy. "Cults," Lasn says,"promise a kind of boundless contentment-punctuated by moments
of bliss-but never quite deliver on that promise. "249 "Nothing ever
satisfies" is a state of mind, like the denial, the numbing, and the
quick fix, which parallels that of addiction.
IV. HARMS AND ADVERTISING: THE PARALLEL BETWEEN
ADVERTISING AND ADDICTION
"Our whole life and thinking was centered in drugs in one form
or another-the getting and using and finding ways and means
to get more. '" 250
A. What Is Addiction?
It is very difficult to talk about addiction since there is no aspect
of it, its definition, its prevalence, or its treatment, that is not hotly
contested. For example, with respect to defining addiction, Dr. Elvin
Jellinek2"' popularized the "disease or medical model" of alcoholism,
likening it to diseases such as diabetes."' According to this model, al-
coholism is an insidious, progressive disease with four distinct phases
that, if left unchecked, inevitably ends in death. 253  Harvard's Dr.
George Vaillant is a proponent of the medical model, but acknowl-
edges that alcoholism's precise etiology is uncertain and, for instance,
as with coronary heart disease, may actually be a result of a combina-
tion of genetic, social, economic, psychological, and behavioral fac-
247. LASN, supra note 49, at 54.
248. LASCH, supra note 185, at 72.
249. LASN, supra note 49, at 54.
250. NARCOTICS ANONYMOUS 3 (5th ed. 1988).
251. E.M. JELLINEK, THE DISEASE CONCEPT OF ALCOHOLISM (1960).
252. The disease model tends to be unitary and dichotomous. That is, one is either an al-
coholic or not. Alcohol use does not neatly fall into such either/or categorizations. Also, the
disease model focuses heavily on the search for some underlying biological or physiological de-
fect. Although some tantalizingly suggestive data has been offered with respect to heredity as a
factor, this search has largely failed to bear fruit with respect to alcoholism. In contrast, lifestyle
and social factors play an enormous role in the etiology of alcoholism (although precisely what
role no one can seem to say). For a detailed exploration of this topic and related data, see
GEORGE VAILLANT, THE NATURAL HISTORY OF ALCOHOLISM REVISITED 1-45 (2d ed.
1995).
253. Seeid.at5.
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tors. 254 Nevertheless, the disease model gained widespread acceptance
in the community and is the prevailing model for alcohol addiction in
the medical and treatment community today, 255 as well as for many
other addictions.
However, the disease model is not a very comfortable intellectual
fit for a variety of reasons. Therefore, the disease model has very vo-
cal critics, among whom the most well-known are Dr. Stanton Peele256
and Professor Herbert Fingarette.257  The aspect of the model that
seems to most offend these two writers is that it appears to them to
deny efficacy and autonomy to its sufferers and to teach sufferers that
they are powerless over their own behavior.2 ' This is an idea Peele
and Fingarette find pernicious and offensive because they believe it
excuses behavior that ought not to be excused and disables the addict
from helping himself.29
Similarly, it is difficult to get a handle on how widespread addic-
tion is: estimates vary widely and are controversial for a number of
reasons. 26" For one thing, studies tend to be broken down by drug and
isolating one substance, for instance, alcohol. Thus, you can find
studies on cocaine, alcohol, or marijuana and so forth,261 but few look-
ing at several of these substances. So it is difficult to get a reliable
number for all substance addictions. This is further complicated by
254. Id. at 17-45. See also John Wallace, Modem Disease Models of Alcoholism and Other
Chemical Dependencies: The New Biopsychosocial Models, 8 DRUGS & SOC'Y 69 (1993). For an
exploration of the social aspects of alcoholism and how it is defined, see JOSEPH GUSFIELD,
CONTESTED MEANINGS: THE CONSTRUCTION OF ALCOHOL PROBLEMS (1996). A similar
kind of debate emerges in response to the claim that excessive television watching is addictive.
Arguably, saying that it is addictive puts the blame on the viewers rather than on the corporate
control of the media where it belongs. See Herbert I. Schiller, Television Is a Social-Not a Bio-
logical or Technological-Problem, 68 TEX. L. REV. 1169, 1171 (1990).
255. VAILLANT, supra note 252, at 4 (noting that the World Health Organization adopted
the disease model in 1973 in response to the numerous professional medical associations that had
already done so).
256. PEELE, supra note 32.
257. HERBERT FINGARETTE, HEAVY DRINKING (1988).
258. See, e.g., PEELE, supra note 32, at 27.
259. Dr. Vaillant notes that such positions often tend to reflect "naive conceptions about
the specificity of the term 'disease' in medicine." VAILLANT, supra note 252, at 44. Vaillant
notes that many other disease definitions like hypertension and coronary heart disease exist on a
continuum and are also "intricately woven into the individual's social life." Id. at 45. Addition-
ally, he disagrees with the idea that the medical model disables the alcoholic from helping him-
self. Instead, he believes that the release from the shame of a moral stigma makes it more likely
that the alcoholic will seek help. Id. at 108.
260. See, e.g., Max Singer, The Vitality of Mythical Numbers, in JUDGMENT, supra note
138, at 408 (describing dubious methods used to calculate the number of addicts in New York
and their contribution to property crime).
261. See infra, note 268.
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the artificial dichotomy erected between legal and illegal drugs.262
Furthermore, addictions often overlap. Many people are poly- or
cross-addicted.263 That is, someone who abuses alcohol often has
other addictive behaviors such as smoking, drug abuse, compulsive
shopping,"' or gambling. 211
Perhaps, the most formidable obstacle to calculating the preva-
lence of addictive behaviors is that people tend to lie266 about them,
making self-reporting, one of the common tools for calculating the
prevalence of addiction, notoriously unreliable. 267 Also, the calcula-
tion of the prevalence of addiction in society at large may be premised
on counting those in the worst trouble, those arrested, those in detox,
and those who self-identify as addicts. To the extent that addiction is
dynamic, a process that sometimes (particularly with alcohol) takes
time to develop, these calculations may miss vast numbers of those
who are behaving addictively but whose addictions have not brought
them into contact with the authorities or the medical community.
Finally, if looked at as a whole, and including addictive behaviors
not related to a substance, such as gambling, sexual addictions, com-
puter/Internet addictions, and compulsive shopping/buying, it ap-
pears that the prevalence of addiction (or addictive behaviors) may be
262. I say "artificial" because alcohol and tobacco cause more loss of life and devastation in
lives than all other drugs combined. See, e.g., David H. Jernigan, The Global Expansion of Alco-
hol Marketing: Illustrative Case Studies and Recommendations for Action, 20 J. PUB. HEALTH
POL'Y 56, 56 (1999) (noting that globally, instances of disease and injury attributable to alcohol
are higher than tobacco and six times higher than illegal drugs). Although I will not address it,
there is an argument that illegal drugs are illegal because they are inherently more dangerous.
263. See, e.g., AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS 270 (4th ed. 1994) [hereinafter DSM-IV].
264. Although, this is relevant to analyzing advertising, very little information is available
to date on it in comparison to substance addictions. The situation is somewhat better with re-
spect to behavioral addictions such as gambling. See, e.g., Sheila B. Blume, Pathological Gam-
bling: Addiction Without a Drug, in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK OF ADDICTION BEHAVIOR
107 (Ilana Belle Glass ed., 1991). However, compulsive shopping has been studied as if it were
an addiction and, as with physiological addictions, a medical solution may be on the way. See,
e.g., Krista Conger, Drug Offers Promising Lead in Treating Compulsive Urge to Shop, STAN.
REP., Dec. 13, 2000, at 13.
265. For an interesting discussion of the growth in this country of legalized gambling, as
well as the increase in gambling disorders or compulsive gambling, see CLOTFELTER & COOK,
supra note 241; Gambling Impact, supra note 241.
266. Whether they are lying or in denial is a matter of disagreement. However, the prob-
lem is that self-reports often are not reliable, regardless of how you characterize the cause of that
unreliability.
267. See, e.g., Deborah Brooks Nelson et. al., The Validity of Self-Reported Opiate and Co-
caine Use by Out-of-Treatment Drug Users, 28 J. DRUG ISSUES 483, 484-85 (1998) (describing the
problems inherent in relying on self-reporting for making estimates of prevalence of drug usage,
but noting that reliability of self-reporting may vary within discrete groups and depend upon a
number of factors.).
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frighteningly large by almost any estimation.268 From the external
view, addiction is a serious social problem. However, as with the in-
fluence of advertising, it is often viewed as a social problem that af-
fects someone else.
Moreover, if one looks at the internal view of addiction, that is, at
the thought processes characteristic of addiction, they are remarkably
similar to those relied upon, stimulated, or encouraged by advertising.
This suggests that advertising appeals to and encourages an addictive
mindset. As the following account vividly demonstrates, if this is even
partially true, it might have serious consequences for our autonomy
and our ability to meaningfully participate in our own and others'
lives. It may also mean that the belief that advertising does not affect
us is one more piece of evidence that we are already hooked.
B. Addiction: The Internal View
Internal descriptions of the experience of addiction compel com-
parisons to the mind set both to which commercial advertising appeals
and to which it may be instilling, whether or not it already existed.
268. For example, the National Institute of Mental Health estimates that one in five
Americans suffer from what it identifies as a mental disorder, but does not classify substance
abuse among the disorders that it lists. See Nat'l Inst. of Mental Health, The Numbers Count, at
http://www.nimh.nih.gov/publicat/numbers.cfm (updated Jan. 1, 2001). Although substance
abuse overlaps with disorders such as suicide, depression, bipolar disorder, anorexia, and obses-
sive-compulsive disorder, to the extent that there is not perfect correlation, one would expect that
adding in substance abuse would increase the number of Americans suffering from a mental dis-
order.
According to United States Census data, in 1998, slightly over half of Americans over twelve
years old reported being a current user of alcohol, 6.2 percent reported being a current user of
any illicit drug, and treatment facilities treated 1,038,378 persons for substance abuse in. U.S.
Dep't of Commerce, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: THE NATIONAL
DATA BOOK 141 (120th ed. 2000). According to the University of Chicago's National Opinion
Research Center, between 2.5 million and fifteen million people may be either experiencing
gambling problems or at risk for such problems. Gambling Impact, supra note 241, at viii. Some
estimates of compulsive shopping report that between five and ten percent of the population is
affected. InteliHealth, available at http://www.intelihealth.com/IH/ihtIH/WSIHWOOO/
9103/23809/238352.html?d=dmtSimple (last visited Nov. 27, 2001).
This fragmentation of the study of addictions into separate substances or types of addictions
makes it very difficult to estimate what the total magnitude of the problem is. Given that people
often under-report these types of behaviors and that treatment centers will only see those who are
both badly off and willing to go into treatment, numbers collected from either self-reporting or
treatment centers must be assumed to also be artificially low. Finally, this leaves out obesity and
eating disorders, which may be related. Yet, if one focuses solely on the number of smokers and
considers that most smokers who report that they would like to quit find it too difficult for rea-
sons pointing to addiction, it seems reasonable to consider that as much as a quarter of the coun-
try is addicted. The Center for Disease Control estimates that in 1999 there were 46.5 million
smokers (or 23.5 percent of the population). See CDC, Cigarette Smoking Among Adults-United
States, 1999, (Oct. 12, 2001) at http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/research.data/adults-prev/
mm5040.htm. Since those who are addicted do not live in isolation, everyone must be affected.
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These similarities are: "bonding" with the addiction; increasing isola-
tion from others; escapism, fantasy, and magical thinking; decreased
capacity to feel or function; and massive amounts of deception of both
self and others. Each of these similarities are explored below.
C. Bonding-Addiction as a "Relationship"
Today, "addiction seems to characterize neither a substance nor a
personality type, but rather a form of relationship."'269 In Drinking: A
Love Story, author Carolyn Knapp describes what she calls her love
affair with alcohol. "By the end[, alcohol] was the single most important
relationship in my life."27 After his introduction to heroin, a heroin
addict says, "I found a new friend. It replaced my parents, girlfriends
and buddies."27' A businessman described cocaine as his lover: "How
wonderful was my new chemical lover. She made me feel so, so good,
again and again. '272 "A friend gave me some speed, and I fell in love,"
writes a person addicted to amphetamines.273
There are probably many explanations for these descriptions of
addiction, some physiological, some psychological, but a common
thread that often runs through these stories is a description of neces-
sity, as if the addiction were life itself. At some mysterious level, the
addict has associated using with living.274 The bond created is one
that seems to promise fulfillment, self-esteem, relaxation, and release
of one's "true self." For example, a girl suffering from depression re-
ported, after her first experience with barbiturates, "By the end of that
first week I felt good. I felt so happy and carefree. I even liked [my-
self]! "275
269. Craig Lambert, Deep Cravings, HARV. MAG., Mar.-April 2000, at 60. Many re-
searchers deeply object to this characterization. "Addiction is a neurobiological disorder," ac-
cording to Bertha Madras, a professor of psychobiology in the department of psychiatry at Har-
vard Medical School. Id.
270. CAROLINE KNAPP, DRINKING: A LOVE STORY 7 (1996) (emphasis added).
271. The War is Over, in NARCOTICS ANONYMOUS, supra note 250, at 270 (personal
story).
272. I Felt Hopeless, in NARCOTICS ANONYMOUS, supra note 250, at 236 (personal story).
273. If I Can Do It, So Can You, in NARCOTICS ANONYMOUS, supra note 250, at 112
(personal story) (emphasis added).
274. JIM HEWITT, ALCOHOLISM: A MATTER OF CHOICE A TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY VIEW OF ADDICTION xxii (1999) ("For the alcoholic, choosing alcohol is felt as
choosing life over death."). The author goes on to argue that this felt connection between alcohol
and life is obviously mistaken, but it explains why the addiction both is so difficult to overcome
and tends to persist despite increasingly negative consequences stemming from it. Id. at xxii-vi.
275. "1 Qualify," in NARCOTICS ANONYMOUS, supra note 250, at 140.
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Of course, the tragedy276 is that this connection is hopelessly and
horribly mistaken.
Addictions can be described as self-nurturing attachments.
They restore image feelings of connection, integration, and free-
dom where there has been distrust, self-dependence, and painful
confusion. Addictions are self destructive because they are not au-
thentic connections. They provide substitute image-feelings that
are impermanent and transient.
The feeling complex-the most important feature of human
life-is centered from birth around bonding. (Note the close
similarity between bonding and addiction: addiction is almost a
natural state.) Bonding provides the human being with his or
her image feelings of connection, integration, and freedom....
Addictions may be set up to take the place of authentic bond-
ing .... Addictions are destructive because they permit fantasy
bonds; they cannot establish an authentic dialectic in the envi-
ronment.277
Interestingly enough, addiction often starts out as a form of real
(or authentic) bonding with other people smoking cigarettes to be in
the "cool" group at school, 278 happy hour after work with the gang, a
little "blow ' 279 to fit in with the high rollers, some "yak ' 28" and a
"40'' 281 to live the gangsta life. However, if sampling progresses to ad-
diction,28 2 it involves withdrawal from other people and more bonding
to the drug or experience instead of other people.
276. This word is not used loosely. Alcohol, to mention only one addictive substance, is
responsible for many annual deaths, although it is difficult to know precisely how many. Short
of death, alcoholism is capable of wreaking havoc and destroying lives and often represents (how-
ever dimly acknowledged) a form of torture for those caught in its grips.
277. HEWITT, supra note 274, at 82-83 (1999). This description sounds uncomfortably
close to the bond that advertisers would like us to establish with their products and services.
Kilbourne makes a similar point, quoting Barbara Ehrenreich as saying that there is an "element
of defiant self-nurturance" in smoking. KILBOURNE, supra note 47, at 193.
278. Cigarettes may represent the exception to the model of withdrawal from people. As
smoking becomes less socially acceptable, withdrawal into clusters of other users becomes more
likely. If there are places you do not go, people you do not hang out with, social or other life ex-
periences that you turn down because you cannot smoke, that is the phenomenon of addiction at
work.
279. Slang term for cocaine.
280. Slang term for cognac.
281. Slang term for alcoholic beverages sold in forty-ounce bottles.
282. I am not suggesting that sampling invariably proceeds to addiction (although it does
for most smokers). See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 169 (Breyer,
J., dissenting) (citing FDA findings that although seventy percent of smokers want to quit, only
about three percent of them a year manage to do so).
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D. Beam Me up Scotty!283-Fantasy, Escapism, and Magical Thinking
Part of what explains the experience of bonding, particularly with
drugs, is that, at first, it works. For instance, alcohol initially provides
some feeling of release from self. Carolyn Knapp describes it as the"phenomenon of taking psychic flight, ingesting a simple substance
and leaving yourself behind. '' 214 Other addicts describe a similar feel-
ing. "We dreamed of finding a magic solution that would solve our
ultimate problem-ourselves.""' Moreover, it is quick and easy. A
nurse who began her addiction with diet pills explained, "Sure, I knew
I could lose weight by watching how much I ate and by doing appro-
priate exercises, but that meant effort, and I saw no reason to expend
effort on something that could be accomplished more easily with the
help of a pill."286 Similarly, an attorney recounts, "When stress arose,
I would escape with drugs. It was simple, quick, and easy." '287
As the addiction progresses, escape from self becomes increas-
ingly necessary. "It became more and more necessary to escape from
myself, for the remorse and shame and humiliation when I was sober
were almost unbearable. '28 8  A large portion of the shame and
humiliation that the active addict feels stems from another facet of
active addiction-a lifestyle of deception.
283. A common phrase used among addicts when wanting to acquire drugs is, "Scotty's
calling," from the popular television show Star Trek. I am indebted to my dear friend Otis A.
for sharing this term with me.
284. KNAPP, supra note 270, at 60.
285. NARCOTICS ANONYMOUS, supra note 250, at 4.
286. TWERSKI, supra note 32, at 98.
287. Id. at 107. It is worth noting that the author of this story recounts how his drinking
and drug use escalated in his first year of law school. This is a frighteningly common response to
the pressure of the law school environment. See Report of the AALS Special Committee on Prob-
lems of Substance Abuse, 44 J. LEGAL EDUC. 35, 45 (1994) ("These data indicate that a substan-
tial number of law students are using various substances as a means for relief of stress or tension,
and those law school behavior problems may foreshadow even more significant problems for
these people as they face the pressures and tensions of the practice of law."); see also G. Andrew
H. Benjamin et al., The Prevalence of Depression, Alcohol Abuse, and Cocaine Abuse Among Ameri-
can Lawyers, 13 INT'L. J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 233, 234 (1990) (finding that levels of depression for
entering students in law school about the same, 3%, as in the general population, but that by the
end of the first year, the number had increased to 32% and at the end of the third year to 40%).
Based on the empirical evidence, it appears that the fear of what these students will do in
practice is well founded. See Manuel R. Ramos, Legal Malpractice: The Profession's Dirty Little
Secret, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1657, 1685 (1994) (noting that lawyers experience "more mental
health problems, alcohol use, and drug use than the population at large"). This may be true of
high stress occupations in general. See, e.g., Sally Gross-Farina, Comment, Fit for Duty? Cops,
Choirpractice, and Another Chance for Healing, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1079 (1993) (discussing the
problem of alcohol and substance abuse among police officers).
288. Freedom From Bondage, in NARCOTICS ANONYMOUS, supra note 250, at 547 (per-
sonal story).
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E. Denial and Deception-Ask Me No Questions and I Will Tell You No
Lies
Active addiction is a lifestyle that requires a lot of maintenance
and a lot of lying:
As my drinking progressed I'd learn to be . . . discreet. So
would most alcoholics I know: We hid what we drank, and when
we drank it and how much and under what circumstances. We
hid it from our friends and families; often, we took pains to hide
it from total strangers. 289
Hiding your usage from other people is a given if you are using
illegal drugs or engaging in illegal activities such as visiting prosti-
tutes. Still, even addictions that involve legal drugs, such as alcohol or
addictions to legal gambling generate an elaborate structure of lies.
Alcoholics vary liquor stores so that the clerks will not be aware of
how much they drink or they might hide bottles in the garbage, refuse
to recycle them, or carry them to other people's trash so that all of the
bottles would not be in their recycling bin for all to see. 29" Gamblers
might pad an expense account, borrow on credit cards, or lie to their
spouse about the use of funds or time.291
According to Knapp, lying is a way of life for alcoholics. "That,"
she says, "is a statement of fact, not of judgment. Alcoholics lie about
big things, and we lie about small things, and we lie to other people,
and (above all) we lie to ourselves." 29 2 Lying becomes a way of life for
all sorts of reasons: to discourage prying from loved ones, to hide the
extent of your drinking/using/behavior from others. Sometimes, it is
for completely trivial reasons, such as when a friend of Knapp's said
she used to lie about the movies she had seen or the books she had
read so that people would think she was more engaged with the world
than she was.293
F. "I Just Want to be Alone"-Isolation and Addiction
Ironically, what often starts out as a bonding experience with
other people becomes, for addicts, a process of detaching from other
289. KNAPP, supra note 270, at 94.
290. Id. at 95. The movie about a female alcoholic, WHEN A MAN LOVES A WOMAN
(Touchstone Pictures 1994), starring Meg Ryan, involved such a scene where Ryan's character
wraps her bottles in a bag before throwing them in the garbage.
291. See Dolores Kong, Agencies Take to Net to Fight Growth of Computer Gambling,
SUNDAY BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 26, 2000, at F8 (including the following questions for on-line
traders to test if they have a gambling addiction: "Have you ever lied to someone regarding your
online trading?" and "Are you becoming secretive about your online trading?").
292. KNAPP, supra note 270, at 176.
293. Id.
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people, not only because addicts have to lie to others and, therefore,
regard them as potential adversaries, but because the progress of ad-
diction is a process of detaching from everything not associated with
the addiction. "The longer I got loaded, the more it seemed people
were getting in my way. After awhile it seemed everybody was against
me. I decided people were my problem, and I didn't want anything to
do with them." '294 A nun described alcohol as her best friend, who
helped her cope with loneliness and homesickness. 2 However, her
best friend "began to take me away from the sisters because she
warned me they would not understand. She was right. Slowly the
drinking became more and more secretive, and I did it alone. 296
Becoming bonded to an addiction means one's life increasingly
centers around "getting and using and finding ways and means to get
more."'2' Of course, a life organized around using and finding ways
and means to get more is an obsession that tends to push out other,
normal activities. Sometimes the addiction itself is, by definition, a
solitary experience, as with computer addictions.298 With illegal
drugs, there is a need for concealment because of the illegality. So, in-
teraction tends to become more and more restricted to fellow users al-
though sometimes even fellow users are shunned for fear that they will
steal the addict's drugs.299
In addition, some drugs like PCP and cocaine apparently increase
paranoia in many users,300 which itself often inspires isolationist be-
havior. Finally, there is something isolating about obsession, even
when in the company of others. "Alcoholics tend to drink alone even
when they're drinking with other people. [A]lcohol isolated me from
other people, even when I seemed to be smack in the middle of
them. "301
294. I Found A Home, in NARCOTICS ANONYMOUS, supra note 250, at 129 (personal
story).
295. TWERSKI, supra note 32, at 127.
296. Id.
297. NARCOTICS ANONYMOUS, supra note 250, at 3.
298. One may object that someone obsessed with spending time in chat rooms is interact-
ing with people. I would argue that this is not "real" interaction insofar as it is not in person.
Although I am not sure how or if I can prove it, I think this makes a difference. Certainly, there
is still some interaction just as there is when you make a telephone call. However, with the
prevalence of the use of false identities in the chat rooms, see KELLNER, supra note 243, at 260,
what real interaction there is arguably is even more attenuated.
299. "I got ripped off a few times. I can remember saying, 'Boy are those guys in bad
shape when they rip off their friends.' Well, six months later, I started ripping them off." A Gift
Called Life, in NARCOTICS ANONYMOUS, supra note 250, at 107 (personal story).
300. "I started getting paranoid, afraid of being busted or killed. I was afraid to talk to go
out in the daytime or to talk to anyone on the phone." It Won't Get Any Worse, in NARCOTICS
ANONYMOUS, supra note 250, at 245 (personal story).
301. KNAPP, supra note 270, at 109.
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The personal stories of people with addictions are characterized
in these recountings over and over again by the same story of alien-
ation, loneliness, and isolation. Interestingly enough, the feeling of
isolation, of being different in some way, very often pre-dates the ad-
diction itself. "I escaped reality through books, TV, sleep, etc. I was
very much a loner, but only because I thought no one wanted to be
around me. I thought that I wasn't pretty enough, smart enough, rich or
popular enough."302 Over and over in these stories, addicts report feel-
ings of alienation3 °3 and loneliness. Not surprisingly, the addict wants
to escape from these feelings and using drugs represents an attempt to
cope with these feelings-to "solve the problem." Instead, it exacer-
bates them. In its later stages, addiction no longer produces the posi-
tive feelings it once did.3"4 Now, simple oblivion is often the goal.
G. Numbing Down-Redux
As one addict tells it, "We forgot how to work; we forgot how to
play; we forgot how to express ourselves and how to show concern for
others. We forgot how to feel."3 The progression of addiction in-
volves behaviors that lower self-esteem, which may never have been
very high,306 to even greater depths. "I was miserable, my highs were
like lows. I couldn't live with drugs but it was worse without them. I
just tried to stay numb or seek oblivion."3 7 "Life becomes so insular
and blank in the last stages of active alcoholism: the drinking at that
point is much less a search for pleasure than it is a search for the ab-
sence of pain."30 8 "I'd drink to numb those tears: drown the feelings,
keep the sadness at bay.- 309
Also, active addiction is, as noted above, all-consuming. That is,
it takes up much of the energy available for other life activities in the
process of using. The diversion of that energy into the maintenance of
addiction means that other interests or concerns diminish in impor-
tance. Users become numbed to their living circumstances and issues
302. 1 Qualify, in NARCOTICS ANONYMOUS, supra note 250, at 140 (personal story),
303. One of the personal stories in Narcotics Anonymous is entitled Alien. Id. at 164 ("I
alienated myself from my family. I did not think that I belonged with them anymore than I be-
longed in this screwed up society.").
304. See, e.g., KNAPP, supra note 270, at 62 ("alcohol makes everything better until it
makes everything worse").
305. Id. at 6.
306. As with loneliness, many addicts report having low self-esteem as a child and/or teen-
ager. See I Qualify, in NARCOTICS ANONYMOUS, supra note 250 (personal story).
307. Nowhere to Turn, in NARCOTICS ANONYMOUS, supra note 250, at 186 (personal
story).
308. KNAPP, supra note 270, at 247.
309. Id.
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that might be intolerable without the use of drugs."' There is a circu-
lar quality to this observation. On the one hand, people often say that
they use or are motivated to use drugs because of social or psychologi-
cal conditions that they find intolerable without the use of drugs, such
as poverty, racism, sexism, low self-esteem, and the like. On the other
hand, the use of the drugs, and the energy directed at maintaining the
illusion of control over using them,"' often undermines the very
things necessary to address or to cope with these problems: energy,
connection to others, motivation, anger, self-respect, and so forth.
H. Summary of Parallels Between Addiction and Advertising Psychology
When one sees the prevalence of low self-esteem or self-hatred in
the reasons why addicts say they felt they had to use, one has to be
concerned about the extent to which advertisers manipulate our anxie-
ties and self esteem in order to sell their products. Certainly, low self-
esteem, depression, feeling ill at ease, rebellion, and similar emotions
are endemic to the human condition. Everyone feels that way some-
times. Yet, how much does the bombardment of advertising contrib-
ute to this feeling? It would be counterintuitive to argue that its con-
tribution is trivial or inconsequential in light of how big a part it plays
in our lives.
Similarly, when advertisers sell the "quick fix," they are selling
the addict's solution, telling us that our problems can be effortlessly
solved by the purchase of a product. The same can be said of escape
and fantasy. Indeed, a prominent marketing analyst from the early
19SOs, Dr. Ernest Dichter, explicitly identified the interests of a capi-
talist, consumerist society with consumption and opined that the job
of advertisers was to convince the average American that "the
hedonistic approach to his life is a moral, not an immoral one. 312
This is probably a solution with universal appeal. It could certainly
explain why we have a sort of love/hate relationship with advertising.
Although there is nothing wrong with fantasy, escapism, or quick
solutions per se, given the experiences of the addicts described above,
this trio does seem to be a poor set of values around which to organize
one's life. It is experience, sometimes hard experience, that hopefully
310. See, e.g., jernigan, supra note 262, at 63 (quoting brewing industry spokeswoman in
Estonia blaming Gorbachev's alcohol policies as increasing the level of dissatisfaction in Estonia
because without the anesthetizing effects of alcohol "they understood where they were living").
311. See, e.g., Norman E. Zinberg, Addiction and Ego Function, in ESSENTIAL PAPERS ON
ADDICTION 151-54 (Daniel L. Yalisove ed., 1997). See also KNAPP, supra note 270, at 152-70
(describing how active addiction often brings the addict's life to a standstill when he uses while
waiting for his life to get better rather than doing anything).
312. PACKARD, supra note t, at 263 (quoting Ernest Dichter).
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teaches us as we mature that there are no "free lunches." Perhaps par-
ents, teachers, and friends have a role in teaching us this as well, but
the role that commercial advertising plays is the opposite. Commer-
cial advertising normalizes and endorses the "quick fix." It suggests
that "everyone else is doing it so you should too." Ads seem to pro-
claim: "Look at all these happy, affluent, attractive people enjoying a
cigarette, a drink, a Big Mac, a trip to Disney World, the comforts of a
Lexus." The inference is, "This could be you if you buy our prod-
uct!" This message is deceptive because, as noted above, even mar-
keters themselves know that things like relationships, self-esteem, and
love cannot be provided by a product. Nevertheless, advertising"pushes what it has to sell, goods and services, "313 as the answer or so-
lution to these desires. In this respect, deception is as integral a part of
commercial advertising as it is of addiction.
Focusing on buying your problems off, as opposed to working
them out in the world with the help and interaction of others, is at
heart the solution to isolation, as are fantasy, escapism, and denial.
Moreover, immersion in this advertising culture is alienating and frus-
trating for those with limited access to consumption power. In a soci-
ety of widening gaps between those lowest on the scale of purchasing
power and those on the highest, 314 it would seem to be a source of con-
cern that those at the bottom are literally steeped in commercial mes-
sages underscoring their plight.
For those at the top of the economic ladder, a life organized
around the values promoted by advertising may result in frustration
and disappointment as "everything" turns out to be not very much at
all.31 The emphasis in advertising on escape, easy solutions, and
quick fixes undermines the very sort of action that might really help to
solve problems of poverty, poor relationships, shyness, and difficulty
at work: communication and collective and individual action.
Having compared how advertising works with how addiction
works, it is time to turn to some societal harms that have been linked
to advertising to further study the parallels.
313. See Jhally, supra note 186, at 809.
314. See SCHOR, supra note 26, at 9.
315. For example, take the 1999 suicide of an Atlantic Monthly executive, Kimberly Jensen.
Jensen was reported to have achieved everything she could have wanted. Yet, friends were
quoted as saying that she was "driven by a thirst for unattainable success." Steven Wilmsen,
Kimberly Jensen's Final, Elusive Journey, SUNDAY BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 12, 1999, at El. In the
end, her financial and professional success was not enough to stop her, "aided by alcohol and
Benadryl" from putting a bag over her head.
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V. COMMERCIAL ADVERTISING AND SOCIAL HARMS
Whatever one thinks of the viability of the theories about the
values underpinning First Amendment protection for speech in gen-
eral, in light of the identification of the various cognitive biases dis-
cussed above, there seem to be specific circumstances in which the
values typically thought to be protected by the First Amendment
come up against competing values of equality or competing definitions
of autonomy. There are too many possible cases to discuss at length
here, so I limit my discussion to three areas: the advertising of addic-
tive substances, advertising directed at children, and advertising that
undermines goals respecting equality for women.
The first area, advertising addictive substances, implicates the
'exception" to First Amendment protection for advertising that is
misleading, as the bulk of this advertising can be characterized as un-
truthful and deceptive. Whatever deception is involved here is par-
ticularly serious because addictive products carry the risk of physio-
logical as well as psychological attachment.
In the second area, advertising to children, all of the assumptions
on which protection for truthful advertising is predicated, no matter
how dubious (that the consumer is a mature, rational person who can
sort through the "puff' to the substance and is entitled to decide for
him- or her-self), disappear. Thus, because the social expectation is
that children are highly impressionable and suggestible, it would seem
that concerns about indoctrinating children into, for example, bad eat-
ing habits, with advertising are far from frivolous.316
Lastly, with respect to the societal goal of equality for women,
the world reflected back at them in the mirror of advertising is by and
large a world in which they have little place except as an object of de-
sire. Advertising magnifies and reinforces this message for women of
color. What little power women in general appear to have through
their status as objects of desire is, for women of color, undercut by
316. However, the power of those constructs can lead to absurd results such as when col-
umnist Larry Magid urges that teenagers simply need to adopt more skepticism toward advertis-
ing. See Larry Magid, Kids Need to Think Critically to Weed out Unsavory Marketing, SAN JOSE
MERCURY NEWS, Sept. 25, 2000, at 4F. In that article, the author is very disturbed by the fact
that his children are the targets of so much marketing, but appears to believe that we are helpless
to come up with any better solution than to urge teenagers to act less like teenagers and more like
an idealized version of adults.
Similarly, an editorial appeared in the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, responding to concerns about
the marketing of credit cards to college students. The editorial urged parents to teach their chil-
dren how to use credit cards responsibly as the cure for the allegation that marketers were prey-
ing both on young people's immaturity and on the likelihood that their parents would pay off
their mistakes to sell credit cards to young people who were subsequently getting in over their
heads in debt. See ST. LoUIS POST-DISPATCH, July 15, 2001, at B2.
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their failure to measure up to that standard's almost uniform white-
ness.31 7 For women, advertising represents a reminder, more potent
and more visible than even pornography, that their professional and
educational achievements take second place in the eyes of the market
to their value as an object of desire.
A. The Special Case of Addictive Substances
Nowhere is the utter uselessness of the Supreme Court's ap-
proval of regulatory authority over advertising's "truth" more appar-
ent than with the alcohol and tobacco industries. Many, if not most,
of the ads for these products can be described as deceptive because
they characteristically attempt to associate cigarettes and alcohol with
freedom, emancipation, companionship, and love when, so often (and
in the case of cigarettes, almost always), they lead to the opposite-
enslavement to an addiction.318 As Jean Kilbourne has pointed out,
"This equation between liberation and addiction, between freedom
and enslavement to tobacco, is particularly ironic, given that nicotine
is the most addictive drug of all ... and most smokers wish they could
quit. ,319
Perhaps more importantly, the tobacco industry, at least, has a
poor track record when it comes to disclosure of the health risks of
smoking (in other words, truthful information). 2 Cigarette manufac-
turers have been caught marketing cigarettes to those too young to
smoke, those they identify as "pre-smokers." They use advertising
campaigns that are appealing to children, such as Joe Camel, as well as
ads associating smoking with adulthood, freedom, and rebellion.32'
Finally, whatever addictive mindsets may be cultivated by adver-
tising in general, the problem of advertising and promotion is most
troubling with respect to products that are themselves addictive, in the
sense that they are prone to create physiological habituation. This
317. See, e.g., Deseriee A. Kennedy, Marketing Good, Marketing Images: The Impact of
Advertising on Race, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 615, 622 (2000) ("The increasing focus on a consumerist
response to social issues, although problematic to the greater society, is particularly troubling for
groups who are disproportionately affected by these issues: the poor, women, and people of
color.").
318. See KILBOURNE, supra note 47, at 155-216 (chapters seven and eight, dealing with
advertising for alcohol and tobacco respectively and offering many examples).
319. Id. at 188. Adbusters has developed several "uncommercials" to highlight this disso-
nance. One is entitled "Joe Chemo" and shows a Joe Camel-like figure in a hospital bed hooked
up to an IV. Another features a sagging Absolut vodka bottle with the banner "Absolut Impo-
tence."
320. See, e.g., Garner & Whitney, supra note 45, at 522 (noting that the tobacco industry
asserted for decades that nicotine was not addictive and that smoking was not dangerous for
one's health, despite general consensus in the medical community to the contrary).
321. See supra notes 164-169 and accompanying text.
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tendency to habituation or physiological addiction, while not sufficient
in itself to create an addiction, certainly appears to increase its prob-
ability.322
Because of this potential, some commentators are tempted to
carve out a special First Amendment exception for addictive products.
This is Professor Sylvia Law's position with respect to addictive sub-
stances.3 23 Although Professor Law rejects the argument that because
commercial advertising is emotive and noninformational it is not enti-
tled to First Amendment protection3 24 (because she believes this would
result in an overly narrow reading of the First Amendment and would
conflict with existing law with respect to puffing), she would appar-
ently carve out an exception for addictive products on the basis of
their tendency to make addiction more likely.S
However, an exception for addictive substances would not neces-
sarily stop at alcohol and nicotine. For instance, caffeine is definitely
addictive, and implicating caffeine implicates some big commercial
players: the soft drink manufacturers. There is little doubt that caf-
feine has detrimental effects on the human body (in addition to some
beneficial ones, depending upon dosages), and is both physiologically
and psychologically addictive.326 Yet, can we stop there? What do we
do about sugar or salt? Now we are treading on shaky ground. That
is, these products are less likely to be the subject of a consensus for an
exception.
Finally, there are many other drugs being marketed today to ad-
dress a variety of psychological ills, the addictive potential, not to
mention other health risks, of which is inadequately known. Based on
the drug companies' historical record, it would not pay to be too san-
guine about the likelihood that the addictive potential has been ade-
322. But see PEELE, supra note 32, at 145-46 (discussing the inadequacy of focusing on the
drug or the addict to predict whether or not someone will become addicted.). An exception may
be cigarettes, which are considered to be virtually always addicting, particularly for those starting
as children. "As many as 90 percent of children who smoke more than two or three cigarettes go
on to become regular smokers." Martin J. Jarvis, Tobacco Smoking: An Everyday Drug Addiction,
in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK, supra note 264, at 97. It is also worth noting that, according
to one source, "the two largest advertisers.., are liquor and cigarettes. They are also the two
chief causes of premature death and loss of work. Together they control 65 percent of newspaper
space and 22 percent of television time." TWITCHELL, supra note 34, at 120 (emphasis added).
323. See Sylvia A. Law, Addiction, Autonomy, and Advertising, 77 IOWA L. REV. 909
(1992).
324. Id. at 930-33.
325. Id. at 945-46. Why create a special niche for addictive products when it is clear that
addiction is not driven solely by the physiologically addictive properties of the substance? Might
it not be more appropriate to simply reexamine the law respecting "puffery"?
326. See How Caffeine Works, at http://howstuffworks.com/caffeine.htm (last visited
Dec. 21, 2001). See also DSM-IV, supra note 263, at 177 (Table 1 lists caffeine as a substance
that can create intoxication and contribute to sleep and anxiety disorders.).
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quately established before these drugs were marketed. "[E]very new
pharmaceutical substance that has reduced anxiety or pain or had
other major psychoactive effects has been promoted as offering feel-
ings of relief without having addictive effects; and in every case, that
promotional claim has proved wrong. ,327
With the removal of restraints on direct commercial advertising
of prescription drugs, we now face a proliferation of advertisements for
drugs like BuSpar and Paxil. An ad for Buspar asks, "Is anxiety over-
whelming you? ... Good thing there's something you can do about it.
A medication called BuSpar (buspirone) can help."3 28 The copious in-
formation provided on the back of the ad lacks all of the emotive ap-
peal of the ad. However, for those tenacious enough to read it, the fine
print notes that while "buspirone has shown no potential for abuse or
dependence... physicians should carefully evaluate patients for a his-
tory of drug abuse and follow such patients closely, observing them for
signs of buspirone misuse or abuse (e.g. development of tolerance, in-
crementation of dose, drug-seeking behavior). '3 29 What this language
represents is unmistakable evidence that the manufacturers do not
know what the potential for abuse of buspirone is.
The treatment of a host of mental illnesses with medications that
are perhaps inadequately tested is fairly controversial.33° David Healy,
the author of The Anti-Depressant Era,"' has claimed that drug com-
panies not only make drugs, but also they make views of illnesses and,
hence, markets for those drugs.332 Now that the pharmaceutical com-
panies are marketing directly to the public, they no longer need to
convince doctors of their diagnosis. Instead, all pharmaceutical com-
panies have to do is convince patients, and the patients will come to
the doctor asking for the medication. "Children who might be better
327. PEELE, supra note 32, at 151. Peele notes that heroin and cocaine are the most well
known examples of this phenomenon, but that the same has been found true of "barbiturates,
artificially synthesized narcotics (Demerol), tranquilizers (Valium), and on and on ...." Id. So,
too, are the new anti-anxiety drugs like Xanax and Ativan.
328. PEOPLE WKLY., Mar. 20, 2000, at 69. An ad for Paxil (paroxetine hydrochloride)
appears with the caption, "Has social anxiety put your life on hold?" Id. at 91.
329. Id. at 70. For a similar statement about Paxil, see also id. at 92. Appropriately, the
technical information for the BuSpar ad is accompanied by a sidebar advertising the National
Anxiety Disorders Screening Day-May 3, 2000. One is invited to visit the website at
http://www.freedomfromfear.org.
330. See Michelle Cottle, Selling Shyness, NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 2, 1999, at 28.
331. DAVID HEALY, THE ANTI-DEPRESSANT ERA (1997).
332. Id. at 229-30. To the extent that some in the field consider sugar addictive, much of
what was said above with respect to children may be applicable here as well. See, e.g., PEELE,
supra note 32, at 236 (quoting a study finding a direct, causal relationship between television
viewing and obesity in children, "the more TV you watch the fatter you get") (citing W.H. Dietz
& S.L. Gortmaker, Do We Fatten Our Children at the Television Set?, 75 PEDIATRICS 807
(1985)).
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served by therapy are being sent away from their doctors' offices with
a prescription for a bottle of pills. '33 A similar concern exists about
prescribing Ritalin and anti-depressants to children.334 While this lat-
ter trend cannot be laid at the door of direct advertising to children, it
seems reasonable to ask how big a role marketing to adults has played.
More subtle still, what effect does it have on us to believe that all our
troubles can be treated with a pill? It looks uncomfortably like laying
the foundation for a junkie mentality. However, this is not really a
new phenomenon with respect to medicine.
B. History and Drug Companies: Patent Medicine Pushers
Drug manufacturers have not had a good track record with re-
spect to pushing addictive products. Between 1880 and the late 1890s,
cocaine and its derivatives were touted as the cure for the morphine
addiction problem which appeared to be gripping primarily "'the edu-
cated and most honored and useful members of society.' 35  Then, in
1898, Bayer introduced heroin, again as a cure for other addictions,
with the promise that, unlike these others drugs, heroin was not habit
forming.336
All of these drugs-morphine, cocaine, heroin, and alcohol-
were sold to the public over the counter in the form of patent medi-
cines that were widely advertised as the cure for virtually anything and
everything that ailed one.337 Manufacturers and advertisers did not,
however, disclose the drug content of these concoctions. Furthermore,"the nations newspapers, deeply beholden to the patent medicine in-
dustry's copious advertising, displayed no interest at all in enlighten-
ing their readers." '338 "To doubly ensure that craven journalistic si-
lence, patent medicine advertising contracts actually stipulated that
333. HEALY, supra note 331 at 230.
334. Paul Raebum, Turning Our Toddlers Into Guinea Pigs, Bus. WK., Apr. 3, 2000, at 44.
335. JILL JONNES, HEP-CATS, NARCS AND PIPE DREAMS: A HISTORY OF AMERICA'S
ROMANCE WITH ILLEGAL DRUGS 17 (1996) (quoting J.M. Hull of the Iowa Board of Health in
1885).
336. Id. at 36.
337. Id. at 24-25.
338. Id. at 24. The identical phenomenon has been documented with respect to cigarettes.
See BOGART, supra note 24, at 98-99 (noting that articles on detrimental health effects of smok-
ing rarely appeared in magazines accepting tobacco advertising over seven year period) (citations
omitted); KILBOURNE, supra note 47, at 52-54. Both because publishers of newspapers and
magazines are extremely dependent on advertising revenues and because tobacco companies are
the largest of print advertisers, this is not surprising. The only thing that is surprising is that
anyone would think it would have been otherwise. As Helen Gurley Brown, publisher of Cosmo-
politan has said, "Who needs somebody you're paying thousands of dollars a year to come back
and bite you on the ankle?" BOGART, supra note 24, at 99 (citations omitted).
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they would be cancelled if any state law were passed affecting the in-
dustry."339
Finally, a series of exposes did appear in which the amount of
drugs in these patent medicines was revealed, and the Pure Food and
Drug Act of 1906311 was passed, in part, in response to this informa-
tion.3 4' However, it was not until 1914 and the passage of the Harri-
son Acts that patent medicines containing drugs like cocaine and her-
oin were rendered illegal altogether.342 But, while this Act may have
been temporarily efficacious in reducing the usage of these drugs, to-
day it looks about as effective as Prohibition. This history should give
one pause in evaluating the claims of the manufacturers of today's"wonder drugs," especially the claim that they are not habit forming.
In short, it seems unwise to rely on the manufacturers of drugs,
whether prescription or over the counter, alcohol or tobacco, to pro-
vide accurate information on the health risks associated with their
products. Historically, these manufacturers have provided accurate
information only under the pressure of government regulation. How-
ever, regulation mandating disclosure and control may not be enough
where the drug pushers, including manufacturers of alcohol and to-
bacco, are permitted to employ emotionally and cognitively salient ad-
vertising that suggests that their products are the solution to life prob-
lems such as shyness, dissatisfaction with work, anxiety, the absence
of a love interest, fun, or excitement in one's life. Although these
products can contribute in some way to a "solution," with the danger
of addiction looming in the background, the benefits appear oversold.
Even if one concludes that nothing can be done about advertising for
addictive products that oversell their benefits when that advertising is
directed at adults because we believe adults ought to rationally dis-
count such inflated claims, this argument carries little weight with re-
spect to children.
C. Advertising and Children
Whether or not we think it likely that an open marketplace of
ideas is most likely to lead to better choices and wider acceptance of"true" ideas on the part of adults, it seems self-evident that such justi-
fications would not apply to children. Nevertheless, no special adver-
tising limits exist for advertising directed at children, and there is no
339. Id. Such a clause could be justified by a perfectly reasonable desire to comply with
state law and to cease a futile advertising campaign if, for instance, such drugs could no longer be
sold.
340. Ch. 3915, §§ 1-13, 34 Stat. 768 (1906) (repealed 1938).
341. JONNES, supra note 335, at 25.
342. JONNES, supra note 335, at 40-47.
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question that much advertising is directed at children or that children
represent an important market for the manufacturers of a number of
products and services.343 With marketing tie-in relationships between
movies and fast food, advertising to children is a big business. 3
Furthermore, it is not just commercial interests that are directing
advertising to children. Those who produce children's entertainment
often actively solicit commercial tie-ins that they believe will boost the
exposure of their product-the movie, the television series, and so
forth. In 2000, McDonald's entered into an agreement with PBS to
market a Happy Meal tie-in to its popular show Teletubbies.34S In re-
sponse, a public interest group called Commercial Alert criticized PBS
for allowing its vice-president for research to speak at a conference en-
titled "Targeting Pre-Schoolers and Their Parents" at the Institute for
International Marketing.346
If it makes you just a wee bit nervous to think of a bunch of peo-
ple convened for the specific purpose of trying to figure out how to get
you and your children as customers, you should not worry; such meet-
ings are normal. As the chair of Teletubbies' U.S. licenser put it, "If
you don't realize your child is a consumer by three years old, you
don't realize the impact the media are having." ''  Apparently the
Swedes and the Norwegians do not feel quite so complacent. They
have banned all TV advertising aimed at children under twelve years
old and are expected to argue that the whole European Community
should follow suit. 348
Meanwhile, in the United States, according to a recent article in
the Boston Globe, children spend some $28 billion a year of their own
money and have, marketers estimate, influence over another $249 bil-
lion.349 The article reported studies finding that the average child sees
343. See, e.g., George Will, The New Adulthood, TULSA WORLD, Nov. 15, 2001, at A16
("children spend, or cause to be spent, huge sums").
344. See, e.g., Rick Lyman & Julian E. Barnes, The Toy Wars for Holiday Movies, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 12, 2001) abstract available at http://query.nytimes.com/search/abstract?res=
FB0612F8395COC718DDDA80994D9404482.
345. SeeA Trojan Horse for Advertisers, Bus. WK., Apr. 3, 2000, at 10.
346. Id.
347. Id. (quoting Kenn Viselman, chair of Teletubbies' U.S. licenser).
348. Id. Such a ban might not have much of an effect on a marketing deal such as this one
since PBS is supposed to be commercial free and McDonald's might be able to float ties with just
in-store promotion. For additional discussion of the variety of responses in Europe to the prob-
lem of advertising directed at children, see Janice H. Kang, Barbie Banished from the Small
Screen: The Proposed European Ban on Children's Television Advertising, 21 NW. J. INT'L L. &
BUS. 543 (2001).
349. Judith Gaines, Mind Games: Psychologists Debate Ethics of Helping Sell to Children,
BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 26, 2000, at Al, B4 (quoting JAMES MCNEAL, THE KIDS MARKET:
MYTHS & REALITIES (1999)).
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more than 20,000 commercials per year and that children as young as
three years old have brand name and logo recognition.3"' Not surpris-
ingly, in light of all this spending, a considerable amount of marketing
research money is spent on studying the children's market. For ex-
ample, marketing researchers have discovered that the area nearest the
cash register is the most valuable in terms of attracting kids and in-
spiring impulse buying by parents because the parents likely already
have their wallets out and are "generally eager to dodge scene-causing
tantrums .... "'51
Obviously, toy manufacturers are among those most interested in
selling to children and have taken to hiring psychologists in order to
find out how to make toys that appeal to children as well as how to
market to them.352 One conclusion the toy industry reached is that
they must get them early. To this end, Toys-R-Us offers miniature
shopping carts that say "shopper in training."3 3 As the former presi-
dent of Kids-R-Us puts it, "If you own this child at an early age, you
can own this child for years to come." '354 The American Psychological
Association (APA) is sufficiently disturbed about this practice that a
petition was floated at the annual meeting in 2000 "calling for con-
demnation of psychologists who assist in marketing and advertising
aimed at children, and to amend its ethics code to limit [the prac-
tice]." 35 As one signatory to the petition put it, "Children are being
bombarded by product advertising at an age when they are vulnerable
and don't have the cognitive ability to differentiate between fantasy
and reality." '356
Of course, as discussed above, it is questionable whether even
adults have the "cognitive ability" to differentiate between fantasy and
reality as far as advertising goes.35 7 Yet, given that it seems uncontro-
350. Id. These figures may be understated. They may not include billboard and print ad-
vertising, not to mention advertising that appears in schools on Channel One, BOGART, supra
note 24, at 73, and in the names of places, such as sports arenas. For example, the former Joe
Robbie Stadium in Miami, now bears the name of National Car Rental. It depends upon how
the study defined "commercial." The use of the word "commercial" is strongly suggestive of a
limitation to broadcast media and video since print advertising is not usually identified as a
"commercial," but rather as an "ad."
351. See TBS II, supra note 141, at 1437 (1999) (citing SELENA S. GUBER & JON BERRY,
MARKETING THROUGH AND TO KIDS 121 (1993)).
352. Gaines, supra note 349.
353. Kalle Lasn, USATM, ADBUSTERS, Winter 2000, at 55.
354. Here's What Some Adults Are Saying Behind Your Back:, ADBUSTERS, Winter 2000, at
67 (emphasis added).
355. Gaines, supra note 349.
356. Id. (citing Susan Linn, associate director at Judge Baker Children's Center in Boston
and an instructor at Harvard Medical School).
357. See supra notes 125-161 and accompanying text.
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versial that children are not "rational" or "autonomous" as those terms
are used for purposes of First Amendment theory, theories that rely
on these concepts to oppose government regulation of advertising do
not offer support for barring regulation of commercial advertising
aimed at children. Since many parents feel that advertising has a dele-
terious effect on children, it is reasonable to ask why the United States
has not followed the lead of those countries that have restricted adver-
tising directed at children. One answer is the advertising lobbies have
successfully blocked such impulses.
In the late 1970s, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) began
to look at advertising directed at children, particularly on Saturday
morning television, and began to contemplate proposing regulations to
limit such advertising.35 The response of advertisers was swift and
brutal. "With some of Washington's most powerful lobbyists looking
on, the Senate Commerce Committee... voted overwhelmingly to
keep the Federal Trade Commission out of such areas as children's
television advertising, used car lots, the insurance industry and con-
sumer products standards."3 9 This move came two years after Con-
gress failed to vote the FTC a budget.36°
Central to this defeat was the FTC's "Kidvid" inquiry, which
hypothesized "that all advertising aimed at pre-teens was inherently
'unfair,' because children cannot tell the difference between advertis-
ing and programming.... ,,361 "The Kidvid inquiry was killed by an
amendment from consumer subcommittee chairman Wendell Ford
(D-Ky.) prohibiting the commission from acting against 'unfair' ad-
vertising. 362 Instead, the amendment substituted the word 'false,' for'unfair."' 363  Then Senator Danforth (R-Mo.), commenting on the
Congressional action, said, "'I don't want to leave any doubt in any-
one's mind -the intent of this action is to kill the Kidvid investiga-
tion. '"'364 According to then Senator Packwood (R-Ore.), forcing the
FTC "to limit its investigation of advertising directed at children to
ads that are 'deceptive' rather than simply misleading" was a result of
the "strong influence of the sugar, tobacco and advertising lobbies." 365
358. Larry Kramer, Senate Panel Votes Stiff Curb on FTC Powers, WASH. POST, Nov. 21,
1979, at Al.
359. Id.
360. Id.
361. Id.
362. Id.
363. Id.
364. Id.
365. Merrill Brown, FTC Temporarily Closed in Budget Dispute, WASH. POST, May 1,
1980, at B1. Notice that Packwood mentioned the tobacco industry. Did it occur to anyone at
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The FTC that emerged from these disputes was a distinctly chastened
one for many years thereafter.3 6
Of course, it is easy to see why advertisers were worried. It is
obvious to anyone living in the United States today that a rule ban-
ning, or even significantly limiting, advertising directed at children
would rather dramatically alter current practices and the commercial
advertising landscape. Billions of dollars are spent organizing com-
mercial tie-ins between children's movies and television shows and a
slew of commercial products, including fast food, toys, video games,
clothing, school supplies, and other items marketed to children.367
Thus, we have fast food tie-ins to Star Wars Episode I: The Phantom
Menace, Star Wars action figures, Star Wars lunchboxes and note-
books, and so forth.368 The concept of the commercial tie-in creates
self-reinforcing symbiosis. The products inspire interest in the mov-
ies, and the movies inspire interest in the products. Pick any recent
media phenomenon, and the same sort of symbiosis is evident: Power
Rangers, World Wrestling Federation, Teenage Mutant Ninja Tur-
tles, and Pok~mon to name only a few.
These examples only scratch the surface of the amount of adver-
tising to which children are exposed. In addition to all the ads that
children see that are not specifically directed at them in the general
environment, as well as those that are on television and so forth, chil-
dren are exposed to advertising in a concentrated dose where many
might least expect it-in school. In high schools around the country,
teenagers are treated to a steady stream of commercials on Channel
One, the supposedly educational channel.369 The superiority of the
ads placed on Channel One compared to those on, for example, net-
work television are obvious because "in-school advertisers" have a
captive audience. As Joel Babbitt, former president of Channel One
that time to question what interest the tobacco industry had in the regulation of advertising di-
rected at children?
366. See, e.g., Peter Grier, FTC Chief Changes Role of "Nation's Nanny," CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Dec. 6, 1983, at 5 (noting that under a new chief, the FTC has approached its regu-
latory mission "with less fervor than it used to"; chief Miller quoted as saying he thought he had"turned around" the congressional perception of the FTC "as a bully"). This article notes that
some members of Congress did not view the change in the FTC policy as necessarily a good
thing. Miller may have been one of the few agency heads who actually pushed Congress "for
explicit curbs on his agency's authority." Depending on sympathies, this looks like either a re-
markable display of duty to the country's interest against one's own putative interest, or a cynical
manipulation of position to achieve other political ends.
367. Lyman & Barnes, supra note 344.
368. Id.
369. Allan Casey, Make Your School an Ad Free Zone, ADBUSTERS, Winter 2000, at 67.
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put it, "The advertisers get a group of kids who cannot go to the bath-
room, who cannot change the station, who cannot listen to their
mother yell in the background, who cannot be playing Nintendo, who
cannot have their headset on. 3 7' Gee! What's not to like?
The in-school ad campaign is not limited to Channel One. Ad-
vertisers also sponsor various programs and offer educational games in
an effort to do a little stealth marketing. Not surprisingly, schools,
which are often chronically starved for funds, are mostly snatching it
up. Adbusters reports that in Evans, Georgia, a student was suspended
from school for wearing a Pepsi® T-shirt to school on Coke® Day, a
day so designated in honor of executives flying in from Atlanta for a
visit.371 If such a move were attempted by the government, it would
be labeled suppression of speech. However, Coca-Cola Co. is not the
government, so it looks like we cannot expect much help from the
First Amendment unless the government abandons its laissez-faire at-
titude with respect to marketing.
Clearly, advertisers think that the elimination of advertising di-
rected at children would have widespread detrimental economic con-
sequences. However, the question is what social consequences follow
from the absence of such a limitation? One consequence that has been
suggested is that the unrestrained marketing of sugary, fatty, and salty
foods, such as breakfast cereals and fast food, has a negative effect on
children's eating habits372 and contributes to childhood obesity and
super-obesity.373 This concern about the tie between children's eating
habits and marketing is not limited to advertising directed at children.
Ironically, it is precisely the concern with children's eating habits that
advertisers have used to sell products to parents, products that not
only do not help solve the problem, but that may also perpetuate it.
In Tylka v. Gerber Products Co.,"' the plaintiffs alleged that Ger-
ber's advertising was misleading because Gerber claimed that its baby
foods were natural and would instill in children a taste for healthy
foods, rather than unhealthy ones, when in fact, Gerber baby foods
370. Here's What Some Adults Are Saying Behind Your Back:, ADBUSTERS, Winter 2000, at
67.
371. Lasn, supra note 353.
372. See, e.g., Judy Hevrdejs, The Plumping of America; Fat Kids: An Unlikely Target of
National Concern, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 17, 1987, § 7, at I (quoting experts who attribute the grow-
ing level of obesity in children in America to television and recommending parents try to restrict
their children's television viewing).
373. This is particularly ironic in light of the culture's preoccupation with thinness. Be-
cause of this, there may be a particularly nasty rebound in the incidence of anorexia and bulimia.
374. Tylka v. Gerber Prods. Co., No. 96-C1647, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10718, at *18-
*19 (N.D. Ill. July 1, 1999), vacated by Tylka v. Gerber Prods. Co., 211 F.3d 445 (7th Cir.
2000).
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were high in sugar and filler that arguably would have the opposite ef-
fect."'5 The advertising claims in the Gerber case seemed designed to
prey on parental anxieties about their children and parental concern
that their children not have future weight problems. The ads lever-
aged parents' love for their children to establish trust in the Gerber
brand to address these concerns. The testimony shows that Gerber's
ads were spectacularly successful.
None of the plaintiffs could remember anything very specific
about what Gerber's ads had said, thus undermining their claim to re-
liance. 76 Over and over, they testified that they basically just remem-
bered the name "Gerber" and trusted it.377 One of the plaintiffs went
farther, saying that he just had a nonspecific, "warm, fuzzy feeling"
from reading the Gerber ad.378 Surely, the Gerber plaintiffs were an
advertiser's dream! They came away from the ads with brand name
identification, trust, and at least in one case, a "warm fuzzy feeling,"
but could not remember anything said with enough specificity to say
that they had relied on it and thus win a law suit. 79 As a result, the
plaintiffs lost the case on summary judgment because the district court
concluded that Gerber's claims were only puffery and thus could not
form the basis of a breach of contract or consumer fraud case. 80
Overall, the current environment of unrestrained marketing di-
rected at children is not supported by the arguments supporting free-
dom of commercial speech for advertising directed at adults. More-
over, advertising seems likely to affect children in ways that we do not
yet completely understand. Advertisers believe that they will affect
children in one very important way: making them enthusiastic con-
sumers. As Huxley wrote in 1958,
375. Id. at *5-*10.
376. Id. at *37-*42.
377. Id.
378. Id. at *40.
379. The case also illustrates another cardinal principle of advertising: if you get the con-
sumers early on, you can generate a ripple effect as one generation often passes on its brand
loyalties to the next. One plaintiff testified in deposition that one of the reasons she bought
Gerber baby foods was that her mother had used them with her and recommended them. Id. at
*37. See also BRUMBERG, supra note 204, at 33 ("We also know, from reports of market re-
searchers, that when American girls begin to menstruate, their mothers usually introduce them to
their favorite brand of sanitary protection and that the girls remain loyal to that brand, generally
without much experimentation."). Failure to independently investigate is rational from the
perspective that experimentation is not costless. It is time consuming and may result in failure.
Thus, if a product appears to be satisfactory, consumers will often choose not to perform
independent market research in order to make the most rational decision, where "rational" is
defined as completely informed. Rather, they will forgo the possibility that more investigation
would reveal a better product to use so long as the product chosen is "good enough."
380. Tylka, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10718, at *17-*33.
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"Think," writes Mr. Clyde Miller ecstatically, "think of what it
can mean to your firm in profits if you can condition a million or
ten million children, who will grow up into adults trained to buy
your product, as soldiers are trained in advance when they hear
the trigger words, Forward March!" Yes, just think of it!381
Such enthusiastic consumers may be those steeped in the ideol-
ogy of materialism, consumerism, and individual solutions to most
problems, living in a world where "identity [is] fused with commodi-
ties. '' 31 It is difficult to see how terribly different (either in ideology
or technique) the advertising stew in which children are steeped is
from the hypnopwdia exercises of Brave New World.383 Like hyp-
nopaedia, advertising may be providing the suggestions by which
many of the child's future, adult decisions and desires will be guided,
however unknowingly.3"4 Like The Director, in Brave New World,
advertisers may exclaim in triumph, "[A]ll these suggestions are our
suggestions! ,3 85
D. Mirror, Mirror on the Wall, Who's the Fairest of Us All?-Women,
Advertising, and the Frustration of the Promise of Equality
One of the most obvious social ills fueled or exacerbated by ad-
vertising and media is the objectification of women. Women's bodies
are used to sell everything from cars to fishing lures. Of course, they
are especially prominent in selling products to women, those pseudo-
necessities: cosmetics, designer clothing, hair coloring, and the like.386
Over and over again, women are explicitly and implicitly told that the
most important thing about them is how they look. Sure, "you've
come a long way baby' 387 and now you can do anything you want-
work at a "man's job," go to law school, be a doctor, aim high!-but
you better look good while you are doing it or you are a failure as a
woman.
Despite decades of progress in some areas, women still lag be-
hind men in earnings and are surrounded by a pornography and pros-
381. HUXLEY, supra note 3, at 64.
382. See Jhally, supra note 186, at 806.
383. HUXLEY, supra note 1, at 25-29.
384. Id. at 28-29.
385. Id. at 29.
386. This is not a phenomenon of recent vintage. Its roots extend back almost fifty years.
In 1957, Vance Packard noted the "triumph of the cosmetics industry in reaching the billion-
dollar class by the sale of hope and making women more anxious and critical about their appear-
ance." PACKARD, supra note t, at 255.
387. See KILBOURNE, supra note 47, at 195-96 (the slogan of the infamous Virginia Slims
cigarette advertising campaign).
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titution culture. 8 that undermines their image in society as workers
among workers or professionals, or indeed, as human beings rather
than as objects. Women are routinely subjected to all manner of as-
saults to their dignity, from street harassment 389 to sexual abuse, from
harassment on the Job" to spousal abuse, and from unequal pay to
unequal opportunity. Still, women are often deemed important only
for their connection to powerful men. Thus, the phrases "arm candy"
or "trophy wife" have become prevalent. Is it any wonder, then, that
some young girls come to view that selling their bodies, whether in
marriage or prostitution (and it is sometimes a challenge to discern the
difference), in mainstream movies or porn, in Glamour magazine or
Hustler, as the only way to get ahead in the world? In such a culture,
we should not be surprised by "Who Wants to Marry a Million-
aire?'""'3
Moreover, many American women, and increasingly women
around the world,3 92 are obsessed with their weight. We do not seem
to be any better off for it, either. An item in Parade Magazine noted
that The American Journal of Public Health reported in a study of
42,000 men and women that women who were clinically fat were 37%
more likely to be depressed.3 93  "Fat men, however, were 37% less
likely to be depressed when compared to men of average weight.
394
The article noted that the difference "appears to reflect how we react
388. Open any phone book in almost any major metropolitan area and you will see pages of
ads for "escort services," "gentleman's entertainment" (read: nude dancing), and other such indi-
cia of exploitation. If the men in your office go to the local "nudie bar" after work, it may feel
just a wee bit uncomfortable or strange for you if you are a woman. The message that it sends to
women is that women are a commodity to be bought and sold just like any other. This makes it
hard to be, or feel, taken seriously.
389. See Cynthia Grant Bowman, Street Harassment and the Informal Ghettoization of
Women, 106 HARV. L. REV. 517 (1993).
390. See, e.g., Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla.
1991). Much of the oppressive material to which Lois Robinson was exposed at work was adver-
tising in the form of promotional calendars by tool manufacturers. Id. at 1493-94. Nude calen-
dars for these manufacturers have long been an industry practice, although the sexual harassment
law suits might have changed that. Marilyn Monroe's famous nude photo on a rosy bedspread
was for such a calendar.
391. See Patrick Schabe, The Great Whoredom, Pop Matters, at http://www.popmatters.
com/tv/reviews/w/who-wants-to-marry-a-millionaire.html (last visited Nov. 18, 2001) (review-
ing Fox's Who Wants to Marry a Millionaire?, which aired Feb. 16, 2000).
392. See supra notes 206-210 and accompanying text (Fiji girls worrying about their weight
with the advent of television, despite cultural norms that prefer weightier women).
393. Obesity is Depressing... for Women But Not Men, PARADE MAG. Mar. 26, 2000, at 16
[hereinafter PARADE]. But see HARRISON POPE ET AL., THE ADONIS COMPLEX (2000) (noting
a similar preoccupation with body developing in men, with predictable negative consequences).
394. PARADE, supra note 393.
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to society's view of us. Fat women are not widely regarded as attrac-
tive, while fat men don't feel that stigma."39
As with all obsessions, there are consequences. Many women
and young girls fall prey to anorexia and bulimia. "Some studies have
shown that from 40 to 80 percent of fourth-grade girls are dieting. 396
"A 1992 survey of eleven to fifteen-year-old Canadian girls revealed
that 50 percent thought they should be thinner. They didn't wish
they were thinner, they thought they should be thinner, as if being thin
were a kind of cultural law. '397 Of course, in this culture, it is a cul-
tural law, and this is not a cultural message that is limited to women,
although, until recently, it has largely been the province of women.
According to the evidence, men are increasingly worried about how
they look and about their value as objects of desire as well.398 It is a
sad and impoverished kind of equality that we seem to be achieving,
where women are catching up to men in lung cancer and cirrhosis of
the liver and men are catching up to women in preoccupation with
their bodies and bulimia and anorexia nervosa.
Finally, as with the other areas discussed, there is some indica-
tion that perhaps education is no defense to absorbing this toxic mes-
sage from advertising. Joan Blumberg, a professor at Cornell, sur-
veyed a number of young women in her classes about their reaction to
advertising containing images of women and asked them to analyze
some ads. As a result, she found that the young women in her class
were "exquisitely sensitive to the cultural pressures surrounding
them" and were "adept in their ability to 'deconstruct' the messages
about women in any ad .... ""'
Nevertheless, knowledge was not power for these young women.
They too, these college students at Cornell, had internalized the com-
mercial messages that surrounded them since childhood and were ter-
ribly concerned about their bodies. "Almost all of them admitted that
they did battle, on a daily basis, with what therapists in the eating dis-
orders world call 'bad body fever,' a continuous internal commentary
that constitutes a powerful form of self-punishment.""4 ° Is this group
just particularly sensitive? That is unlikely in light of the abundant
395. Id. Men had their own problems. Men with lower than average body weight were
twenty-seven percent more likely to be depressed. "It seems that being a 'portly' man is consid-
ered more acceptable than being thin and scrawny." Id. This is consistent with the authors'
conclusions in POPE ET AL., supra note 393.
396. KILBOURNE, supra note 47, at 134.
397. LASN, supra note 49, at 75 (emphasis added).
398. SUSAN FALUDI, STIFFED 451-574 (1999) (section entitled "Hood Ornaments").
399. BRUMBERG, supra note 204, at 196.
400. Id. (emphasis added).
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evidence that this "body fever" is widely shared, to varying degrees,
by American women in every racial and socioeconomic group. 40 1
CONCLUSION
In the above discussion, I have only scratched the surface of the
potentially negative effects of advertising. Not mentioned are the de-
batable connections between advertising and violence, gun purchases,
gambling, environmental degradation, or loss of community. More-
over, much of what I have said here could also be applied to the enter-
tainment media in general. Certainly, the numbing down, isolation,
and fantasy effects are even more prominent there. "America has en-
tered a second adolescence with the following characteristics: grandi-
osity and a sense of invulnerability, heightened self-absorption, ironic
detachment and defensiveness, and a preoccupation with appearance
and sex. Media critic Steven Stark adds 'defiant, oppositional anger'
to the list. Most of these are characteristics of addiction as well. 40 3
Although, as Kilbourne notes repeatedly in Deadly Persuasion, it is dif-
ficult to prove, and probably not true, that advertising causes these
ills, it surely contributes to them.
Given decades of intense interest by advertisers and marketers in
figuring out how our minds work,40 4 and many more decades of bom-
bardment by advertising, it does not seem unreasonable to attribute
some of these characteristics to that bombardment. The only way to
make a dent in some of these problems is to address them in their for-
mation, so that we can, as the joke goes, figure out what is going on
upstream. The First Amendment is the shelter that commercial inter-
ests will and do seek in response to such efforts. However, "[t]he
truth is that the First Amendment was not meant to protect commer-
401. See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 317, at 622.
402. See, e.g., Jack Gibbons, The Price is Right?, in SCHOR, supra note 26, at 49-52 (2000)
("[W]e need to recognize we are heading into truly dangerous waters: too many people consum-
ing too many resources on a finite planet.").
403. KILBOURNE, supra note 47, at 225.
404. Curiously, we do not view this as research on human subjects. Such research in aca-
demia is subject to strict, some say inappropriate, controls pursuant to federal regulation. See
Christopher Shea, Don't Talk To The Humans: the Crackdown on Social Science Research,
LINGUA FRANCA, Sept. 2000, at 27. Why do these controls apparently not apply to marketing
research done in the field? "One of the fundamental considerations involved here [in advertis-
ing] is the right to manipulate the human personality" when such manipulation would seem to
entail "a disrespect for the individual personality." PACKARD, supra note t, at 259 (internal
quotations omitted). The Packard quote demonstrates that although this ethical question was
raised early on, it seems to have been largely forgotten in the ensuing decades.
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cial free speech and that commercial free speech today is often the en-
emy of private speech." 40 5
As Calvin Coolidge said, "The business of America is busi-
ness."4"6 The fact that First Amendment protection was extended to
commercial speech not long after Huxley voiced his concern-that his
vision in Brave New World was coming true even faster than he had
thought it would 4" 7 -is one measure of the truth of Coolidge's state-
ment. Today, the business of business is consumption and the manu-
facture of the desire to consume. It is a, if not the, central organizing
ethos of our society. If America's business is consumption, it may ex-
plain why politics so often look irrelevant, as if our elected officials
were, like movie sets in old Westerns, false fronts for the crucial busi-
ness of consumption.
This article suggests that there may be some undesirable conse-
quences flowing from or related to the choice to elevate consumption
to our highest duty and to allow largely unrestrained marketing to
stimulate that consumption. The "sacred" right of free speech is
where property owners today seek to protect the right to manipulate us
and distort our values to serve their own ends. These ends are not
necessarily society's ends. However, it should be remembered that
just as the Realists' insights revealed that the existing distribution of
property was not "natural" in the sense that it was not constituted by
governmental decisions, so too speech. It is worth considering
whether the current architecture of the First Amendment with respect
to commercial speech is one we can afford to live with or whether we
may not be imperiling our well-being with our complacency.
405. KILBOURNE, supra note 47 at 311. Ms. Kilbourne is not a lawyer, so perhaps she does
not see the irony in this statement. For purposes of current First Amendment doctrine, com-
mercial speech is private speech, no matter how much it dominates and affects the public dis-
course. Just another example of the incoherence of the public/private distinction that has been
thoroughly criticized so often by so many. This is a point echoed by Professor Twitchell, who
also notes that the First Amendment "makes no provision against external corporate forces and
certainly not even a hint of protection against internal forces" for censorship. TWITCHELL, su-
pra note 34, at 119. In this passage, Professor Twitchell is referring to corporate censorship of
content. However, the mirror of this absence of a prohibition on corporate censorship in an envi-
ronment of corporate domination is the specter of corporate indoctrination. Surely, the First
Amendment was not meant to protect someone else's right to abridge our speech?
406. Calvin Coolidge, Address to Society of Newspaper Editors (Jan. 17, 1925), reprinted in
INTERNATIONAL THESAURUS OF QUOTATIONS 102 (1970).
407. See Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
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